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I. INTRODUCTION 
In April 1967, Aretha Franklin released what would 
become her signature song—the timeless classic, “Respect.”1 This 
emotionally evocative track—with its fervent vocal delivery, 
wailing horns, and funky guitar—was Franklin’s “first Number 
One hit and the single that established her as the Queen of Soul.”2 
By all standards, it was a massive success for the legendary 
American singer—an artistic triumph that she would not be able to 
top during the remaining years of her bright career. In addition to 
being Franklin’s crowning musical achievement, her impassioned 
plea for respect also served as inspiration for the feminist 
movement of the 1960s. The song resonated as an “assertion of 
selfhood in the women’s movement,” and, in the process, solidified 
its place as an “enduring milestone” in popular music.3 To this day, 
its influence remains as strong as ever, having been selected by 
Rolling Stone as the fifth greatest song of all time.4  
Although “Respect” is most commonly associated with 
Aretha Franklin, it was in fact written and first recorded by the late 
Otis Redding in 1965.5 Redding’s version—which differed 
significantly from Franklin’s later interpretation—was well 
received, peaking at number thirty-five on the Billboard charts.6 
However, it was not until Franklin lent her powerful and soulful 
voice to the composition—and significantly reworked the style and 
                                                 
1
 PETER GURALNICK, SWEET SOUL MUSIC: RHYTHM AND BLUES AND THE 
SOUTHERN DREAM OF FREEDOM 332 (1986). 
2
 500 Greatest Songs of all Time, Aretha Franklin, ‘Respect’, ROLLING 
STONE, http://www.rollingstone.com/music/lists/the-500-greatest-songs-of-all-
time-20110407/aretha-franklin-respect-20110516 (last visited July 14, 2013).  
3
 Aretha Franklin Biography, THE ROCK & ROLL HALL OF FAME MUSEUM, 
http://rockhall.com/inductees/aretha-franklin/bio (last visited July 14, 2013).  
4
 Aretha Franklin Biography, supra note 3.  
5
 GURALNICK, supra note 1, at 150-51. 
6
 Otis Redding Chart History, BILLBOARD, http://www.billboard.com/artist/
320562/otis-redding/chart?page=1&f=379 (last visited Feb. 18, 2014). 
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arrangement—that the song became the classic that it is today.7 
The enormous success of Franklin’s version completely eclipsed 
that of the original—so much so that even Redding himself 
playfully commented that she “stole that song from” him.8 Yet, 
despite Franklin’s invaluable contributions to Redding’s 
composition, the U.S. Copyright Act does not grant her full public 
performance9 rights in her recording.10 The Copyright Act grants a 
full public performance right to authors of “musical works,”11 but 
only a partial performance right to authors of “sound recordings.”12 
Specifically, “[t]he exclusive rights of the owner of copyright in a 
sound recording are limited”13 to public performances “by means 
of a digital audio transmission.”14  In other words, Franklin does 
not have the exclusive right to perform her sound recording 
publicly, and, as such, is not entitled to receive any royalties when 
her recording is played on terrestrial radio stations (also known as 
                                                 
7
 500 Greatest Songs of all Time, supra note 2. 
8
 Aretha Franklin, Respect, Composed by Otis Redding, ALLMUSIC, http://
www.allmusic.com/song/respect-mt0008606729 (last visited Feb. 20, 2014). 
9
 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012) (“To perform or display a work ‘publicly’ means . 
. . to transmit or otherwise communicate a performance or display of the work to 
. . . the public, by means of any device or process, whether the members of the 
public capable of receiving the performance or display receive it in the same 
place or in separate places and at the same time or at different times.”). 
10
 David Byrne, Performance Royalties on Commercial Radio, THE 
VLOGGERHEADS ZONE (Jan. 28, 2014, 8:26 PM), http://www.vloggerheads.com/
profiles/blogs/performance-royalties-on-commercial-radio. 
11
 17 U.S.C. § 106(4) (2012) (“[I]n the case of literary, musical, dramatic, 
and choreographic works, pantomimes, and motion pictures and other 
audiovisual works, to perform the copyrighted work publicly . . . .”). 
12
 Id. § 106(6) (“[I]n the case of sound recordings, to perform the 
copyrighted work publicly by means of a digital audio transmission.”). 
13
 Id. § 114(a) (“The exclusive rights of the owner of copyright in a sound 
recording are limited . . . and do not include any right of performance under 
section 106(4).”). 
14
 Id. § 106(6). 
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AM/FM radio).15 Despite receiving extensive airplay on AM/FM 
stations since the song’s release in 1967, Franklin’s rendition of 
“Respect” has not earned the singer a dime in royalties from the 
terrestrial radio stations that play it. Meanwhile, Redding’s estate 
continues to enjoy a full public performance right in his 
composition, and is paid a royalty every time Franklin’s version of 
“Respect” is played on the radio.16 
As the above example illustrates, copyright law subjects 
songwriters and performers to strikingly unequal treatment. For 
decades, performers have been lobbying Congress to correct this 
unfair imbalance in the Copyright Act.17 Their pleas, however, 
have thus far been ignored, with Congress refusing, time and time 
again, to extend the general performance right to sound 
recordings.18 As a result, terrestrial radio stations continue to 
broadcast recordings without having to compensate the performers 
who bring those songs to life.19 This system not only fails to 
recognize the great value that an engaging and talented performer 
can add to a composition, but also provides an additional incentive 
to songwriters, who enjoy the right to exclude others from publicly 
performing their compositions, and are paid royalties when their 
                                                 
15
  Performers are also not entitled to receive royalties when their songs are 
played on television or in a public venue such as a restaurant or hotel. See John 
Miranda, Music Licensing for Restaurants, Bars, and Retail Establishments, 
CBA REC., Jan. 2014, at 47, 47.  
16
 Michael Huppe, "You Don't Know Me, but I Owe You Money": How 
SoundExchange is Changing the Game on Digital Royalties, ENT. & SPORTS 
LAW., Fall 2010, at 3, 4. 
17
 Sunny Noh, Better Late Than Never: The Legal Theoretical Reasons 
Supporting the Performance Rights Act of 2009, 6 BUFF. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 83, 
91 (2009). 
18
 Byrne, supra note 10. 
19
 If sound recordings were subject to a full public performance right, 
terrestrial broadcasters would be required to pay sound recording copyright 
holders for the use of such works. Often the performer’s record label owns the 
sound recording copyright in recordings that they have financed. See infra Part 
II.A. 
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songs are played.20 Moreover, the United States is the only 
developed country in the world that does not grant performers full 
public performance rights, “placing the United States in a category 
with North Korea, China, and Iran in excluding these rights.”21 
Many countries have reciprocated by withholding millions of 
dollars in royalties from American performers, resulting in a 
significant economic loss for the United States.  
In the 1990s, new methods of consuming music were 
introduced to the world with the advent of the Internet. The new 
technologies brought about during the Internet revolution had a 
devastating effect on music sales, wreaking havoc on the tried-and-
tested business model of the music industry. One such technology 
is “webcasting”—the non-interactive, continuous transmission of 
music or other audio programming on the Internet to one or more 
persons.22 Also known as “Internet radio,” webcasting is 
essentially the Internet equivalent of a terrestrial radio broadcast. 
Like other digital audio services such as satellite radio and cable 
radio, webcasting offers crisp sound quality that is arguably 
superior to that of analog terrestrial radio. Concerned that these 
new technologies had the potential to bring the music industry to 
its knees, the recording industry was finally able to convince 
Congress that those whose livelihoods depended on music sales 
deserved stronger rights under the Copyright Act.23 As a result, 
Congress enacted the Digital Performance Right in Sound 
Recording Act of 1995,24 which provided performers with a limited 
public performance right in their recordings. The right was limited 
                                                 
20
 17 U.S.C. §§ 106, 114 (2012). 
21
 Noh, supra note 17, at 103 n.167. 
22
 Rebecca F. Martin, Note, The Digital Performance Right in the Sound 
Recordings Act of 1995: Can It Protect U.S. Sound Recording Copyright 
Owners in A Global Market?, 14 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 733, 743 (1996). 
23
 Id. at 744. 
24
 Digital Performance Right in Sound Recording Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 
104-39, 109 Stat. 336 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.) 
[hereinafter DPRA 1995]. 
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in the sense that it only granted performers the exclusive right to 
license the performance of their copyrighted works publicly by 
means of a digital audio transmission. That is, terrestrial radio 
stations were not affected by the Act, and remain free to continue 
broadcasting songs without permission from—and without paying 
any royalties to—performers.25  
Today, depending on the medium used to broadcast a sound 
recording, the compensation paid to the performer varies 
considerably.26 That is to say, the law is violating the core 
governing economic principle that laws be technologically 
neutral.27 Whereas terrestrial broadcasters are exempt from paying 
performers any royalties for the use of their recordings, webcasters 
are required to pay exorbitant fees, which, in some cases, “often 
approach or even exceed 100% of revenue for many webcasters.”28 
Satellite radio and digital cable radio services, meanwhile, are also 
required to pay a royalty to performers—yet, because these 
services are grandfathered to a different royalty rate determination 
standard than that used for webcasters, they pay fees that pale in 
comparison to their Internet radio counterparts. As a result, 
terrestrial broadcasters, satellite radio, and digital cable radio 
services enjoy a significant advantage over webcasters, who are 
struggling to survive under the current royalty scheme. This is 
despite the fact that all of these services perform essentially the 
same function.  
                                                 
25
 Kamesh Nagarajan, Public Performance Rights in Sound Recordings and 
the Threat of Digitalization, 77 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y 721, 723 
(1995). 
26
 Andrew Stockment, Note, Internet Radio: The Case for A Technology 
Neutral Royalty Standard, 95 VA. L. REV. 2129, 2161–62 (2009). 
27
 Daniel Castro, Internet Radio and Copyright Royalties: Reforming a 
Broken System, INFO. TECH. & INNOVATION FOUND. (May 10, 2007), 
http://www.itif.org/files/InternetRadio.pdf. 
28
 Stockment, supra note 26, at 2161. 
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As more and more webcasters are unable to sustain their 
businesses due to high royalty burdens, both consumers and artists 
are losing out. The fact of the matter is that Internet radio has 
become incredibly popular since its introduction in the 1990s, with 
listenership having reached a staggering 42% of adult U.S. 
broadband households.29 Consumers have flocked to Internet radio 
for a number of reasons: it can be accessed anytime—from 
virtually anywhere—via applications on mobile devices,30 and it 
offers musical diversity that is simply not available on terrestrial 
radio.31 For these reasons, Internet radio also serves the interests of 
a broad range of artists in a way that terrestrial radio cannot.32 
Thus, it is crucial that the current law is changed to ensure that 
webcasters are able to effectively compete with other audio 
services. It is essential that consumers and artists be able to 
continue to enjoy the benefits that Internet radio provides. 
In this paper, I will describe, in detail, how the Copyright 
Act not only provides unequal treatment to songwriters and 
performers, but also unfairly discriminates against webcasters by 
subjecting them to prohibitively high royalty rates. In Part II, I will 
provide an overview of music copyright law, which will include a 
brief historical analysis of copyright law’s bias toward songwriters 
at the expense of performers. In Part III, I will discuss the advent 
of the Internet and its effect on the music business. In doing so, I 
                                                 
29
 TARGETSPOT, TARGETSPOT DIGITAL AUDIO BENCHMARK AND TREND 




 Jessica L. Bagdanov, Comment, Internet Radio Disparity: The Need for 
Greater Equity in the Copyright Royalty Payment Structure, 14 CHAP. L. REV. 
135, 154 (2010). 
31
 See Kaitlin M. Pals, Note, Facing the Music: Webcasting, Interactivity, 
and a Sensible Statutory Royalty Scheme for Sound Recording Transmissions, 
36 J. CORP. L. 677, 692 (2011). 
32
 For example, Internet radio does not “suffer from the same geographical 
limitations of terrestrial stations’ analog signals.” Id. 
8
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will provide an overview of the Digital Performance Right in 
Sound Recordings Act of 1995 and the Digital Millennium 
Copyright Act of 1998.33 In Part IV, I will outline, in detail, the 
royalty rate determination procedures used to calculate rates for 
digital radio services. This will include an introduction to the two 
standards used to determine rates: the 801(b) Standard, which is 
applied to certain digital satellite and digital cable radio services; 
and the willing buyer/willing seller standard, which is applied to 
webcasters. In Part V, these two standards will be examined, in 
detail, in order to demonstrate why they produce drastically 
different royalty rates. Finally, in Part VI, I will propose several 
measures that can be taken to correct the problems inherent in the 
current public performance royalty scheme. Specifically, I will 
argue that the law must be amended to become technologically 
neutral. To achieve technological neutrality, two changes must be 
made. First, the public performance royalty exemption currently 
enjoyed by terrestrial radio stations must be brought to an end. 
Second, the same royalty rate standard must be applied to all radio 
services. In Part VI, I will also briefly discuss several pieces of 
recent legislation that attempt to change the current status quo, but 
have thus far not passed in Congress. 
II. MUSIC COPYRIGHT LAW: AN OVERVIEW  
A. Musical Works and Sound Recordings 
Music copyright law “is notoriously complex.”34 In order to 
fully appreciate the current inequity facing performers, it is 
important to have a general understanding of copyright law as it 
pertains to music. Unlike other works, such as paintings or poems, 
                                                 
33
 Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 
(1998) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.) [hereinafter 
DMCA 1998]. 
34
 THOMAS D. SYDNOR II, A PERFORMANCE RIGHT FOR RECORDING 
ARTISTS: SOUND POLICY AT HOME AND ABROAD 1 (2008), available at http://
www.pff.org/issues-pubs/pops/pop15.2performanceright.pdf.  
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any given musical recording has two copyrightable elements: the 
musical composition and the sound recording.35 The musical 
composition (also referred to as a “musical work”) is the fixed 
sequence of words, notes, and rhythms “which can be captured in 
written form and which structure the ‘generic’ sound of any given 
performance of a piece.”36 The sound recording, on the other hand, 
is the recorded version of the underlying composition. The 
Copyright Act defines a sound recording as a “fixation of a series 
of musical, spoken, or other sounds . . . regardless of the nature of 
the material objects, such as disks, tapes, or other phonorecords, in 
which they are embodied.”37 Whereas the musical works 
category38 protects the copyright owner’s interest in the fixed 
sequence of words, notes, and rhythms that amount to the 
underlying song, the sound recordings category39 protects the fixed 
performance of those words, notes, and rhythms. Thus, there may 
be multiple cover versions of any given musical composition, each 
of which is copyrightable for the originality of its sound 
recording.40 Whereas “[t]he copyright in the musical work . . . 
belongs to the author or composer of the song who typically 
assigns his or her rights to a publisher for the purposes of 
                                                 
35
 See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(2) (2012) (covering “musical works, including 
any accompanying words”); Id. § 102(a)(7) (covering “sound recordings”). 
36
 Thomas P. Wolf, Note, Toward a “New School” Licensing Regime for 
Digital Sampling: Disclosure, Coding, and Click-Through, 2011 STAN. TECH. L. 
REV. N1 6 ¶ 12.  
37
 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012). 
38
 Id.  § 102(a)(2). 
39
 Id. § 102(a)(7). 
40
 Brian Day, Note, The Super Brawl: The History and Future of the Sound 
Recording Performance Right, 16 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 179, 183 
(2009). Note that when a copy of a literary or pictorial work is made, there are 
not necessarily any accompanying changes made to the original work. However, 
the performance of a musical work necessarily involves changes being made to 
the original work. 
10
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representation, . . . sound recording copyrights . . . are normally 
owned by the artist or record label.”41  
Together, these two separate elements create a dual layer of 
copyright protection in a single recorded musical work. Because 
the Copyright Act establishes these distinct interests in each song, 
it is possible for multiple parties—both legal and natural persons—
to have a copyright ownership in any given musical recording.42 
The simplest possible ownership scenario would involve a 
songwriter who has written, and subsequently recorded, his or her 
own song. So long as that performer-songwriter does not assign 
ownership of the song to a third party via a publishing or recording 
deal, the performer-songwriter will retain full copyright in both the 
underlying composition and sound recording. Whenever that song 
is then played or purchased, the performer-songwriter is entitled to 
collect all of the royalties generated.43 However, the situation is 
rarely this straightforward, as demonstrated by the example 
involving Aretha Franklin’s version of “Respect,” and the royalty 
payments generated therefrom.   
                                                 
41
 Id. at 182–83.  
42
 David M. Jenkins, The Singer/Songwriter Wears Two Hats: An 
Introduction to Music Copyrights and the Singer/Songwriter's Sources of 
Income, DCBA BRIEF, Feb. 2006, at 22, 24. Note that the two-tier structure of 
music copyright is universal in nature. In most jurisdictions, including Japan, 
Canada and other signatories of the Rome Convention, the rights that attach to 
sound recordings are known as “neighboring rights.” Whereas the structure 
under such systems is different than the structure under U.S. copyright law, the 
substance is essentially the same. In the Japanese Copyright Act, for example, 
performers—including actors, musicians and dancers—are granted certain 
economic and moral rights. 
43
 See id. at 25–26. 
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Figure 1: Music Copyright Structure44 
B. Copyright’s Exclusive Rights Prior to The DPRA 
U.S. copyright law grants a number of exclusive rights to 
the owner of a protected work. Prior to 1995, there were five such 
exclusive rights enumerated in § 106 of the Copyright Act, all of 
which continue in effect today. These rights include: (1) the right 
to reproduce copies of the work, (2) the right to create derivative 
works, (3) the right to distribute copies of the work to the public, 
(4) the right to perform the work publicly, and (5) the right to 
                                                 
44
 Brian Day, In Defense of Copyright: Record Labels, Creativity, and the 
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display the work publicly.45 However, not all protected works 
enjoy the benefit of each of the five exclusive rights. Namely, with 
respect to musical works and sound recordings, the law grants 
significantly different rights to songwriters and recording artists. 
That is, whereas songwriters enjoy the exclusive right to perform 
their works publicly, recording artists do not.  
As per § 106 of the Copyright Act, both the compositional 
copyright holder and the sound recording copyright holder have 
the exclusive rights to reproduce their works, make derivative 
works, and distribute their works. The holder of the copyright in a 
musical composition, however, has an additional right—the public 
performance right—which does not belong to the holder of a 
copyright in a sound recording.46 The public performance right 
gives the compositional copyright owner the power to prevent their 
work from being performed publicly, such as by way of broadcast 
over any type of radio.47 This means that, before a song is played 
on analog AM/FM radio stations, the broadcaster must obtain 
permission from the owner of the copyright in the underlying 
work.48 Moreover, whereas the compositional copyright owner is 
                                                 
45
 17 U.S.C. § 106(1)–(5) (2012). Note that the Japanese Copyright Act 
(Act No. 48 of 1970) has a similar structure with respect to exclusive rights. See  
Arts. 21–28.  
46
 As mentioned in Part I, and to be discussed in detail below in Part III.C, 
sound recording copyright owners, in 1995, were granted a limited public 
performance right—namely, the exclusive right to license the performance of 
their copyrighted works publicly by means of a digital audio transmission.  
47
 17 U.S.C. § 106(4) (2012). 
48
 This is typically done by way of a blanket license issued by one of the 
three Performing Rights Organizations (PRO) in the United States: ASCAP, 
BMI and SESAC. Each of the three PROs issues blanket performance licenses 
to radio stations, restaurants, bars, and other establishments that play music 
publicly. Such establishments typically pay a single fee to the PRO in exchange 
for the blanket license, which enables them to play any song in that PRO’s 
catalog. The PRO will then distribute the license fees as royalties to its members 
(i.e. songwriters, composers and music publishers) whose works have been 
performed. Broadcast radio stations typically pay a percentage of their gross 
13
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paid a royalty for the use of their song on terrestrial radio,49 the 
owner of the sound recording copyright is not. Throughout the 
history of terrestrial radio, stations have been—and continue to 
be—free to transmit over the airwaves any sound recording, 
without obtaining the permission of sound recording copyright 
owners, and without paying them a dime in royalties.50  
C. A History of Unequal Treatment of Songwriters and Performers  
 Songwriters and recording artists have always been granted 
significantly different rights under U.S. copyright law. In 1831, 
U.S. copyright law granted, for the first time, protection to authors 
of musical compositions for reproductions in print form.51 Years 
later, in 1897, songwriters saw their rights further enhanced when 
they were granted a public performance right for their works.52 
“During the early years, such rights were difficult to enforce.”53 
Not until the enactment of the Copyright Act of 190954 did the 
situation improve.55 The 1909 Act “overhauled many preceding 
copyright laws, and created a clear property interest in 
performance rights for musical compositions and dramatic 
                                                                                                             
revenue (roughly 2% each) to both ASCAP and BMI, and slightly less to 
SESAC. Stockment, supra note 26, at 2161–62. 
49
 A compositional copyright holder will collect royalties from whichever 
PRO they have joined as a member. Each PRO uses a complicated formula to 
determine how the pool of money that they have collected from copyright users 
should be distributed. 
50
 Pals, supra note 31, at 679; see also Bonneville Int’l Corp. v. Peters, 347 
F.3d 485, 487 (3d Cir. 2003). 
51
 Act of Feb. 3, 1831, ch. 16, § 1, 4 Stat. 436. 
52
 Act of Jan. 6, 1897, ch. 4, 29 Stat. 481. The story of how this Act was 
passed is recounted in Zvi S. Rosen, The Twilight of the Opera Pirates: A 
Prehistory of the Exclusive Right of Public Performance for Musical 
Compositions, 24 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1157, 1200–16 (2007).  
53
 Noh, supra note 17, at 89. 
54
 Act of Mar. 4, 1909, Pub. L. No. 60-349, 35 Stat. 1075. 
55
 Noh, supra note 17, at 89. 
14
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works.”56 Nevertheless, these rights were limited to public 
performances that were engaged in for profit.57 
By the late 1700s, “printed copies of musical works (i.e., 
sheet music) became an important source of income for music 
publishers.”58 Because the use of sheet music offered a 
“commercially viable means of fixing, copying and publicly 
performing musical compositions,” the bolstering of federal 
copyright protection for musical compositions under the Copyright 
Act of 1909 became an important issue.59 A commercially viable 
means of fixing and replaying sound recordings, on the other hand, 
did not yet exist at the time of the enactment of the Copyright Act 
of 1909.60 Consequently, the justification for extending copyright 
to sound recordings had not yet arisen, and no protection was 
offered for recordings under the 1909 Act.  
 In the years following the passage of the Copyright Act of 
1909, two parallel technological developments spurred the debate 
over the issue of granting copyright to sound recordings.61 On the 
one hand, advancements in the development of radio transmissions 
facilitated the widespread dissemination of public performances of 
musical compositions.62 This was followed by advancements in 
                                                 
56
 Id.  
57
 Act of Mar. 4, 1909, Pub. L. No. 60-349, § 1(e), 35 Stat. 1075. 
58
 Graeme W. Austin, Radio: Early Battles Over the Public Performance 
Right, in COPYRIGHT AND THE CHALLENGE OF THE NEW § 5.03 115, 123 (Brad 
Sherman & Leanne Wiseman eds., 2012). 
59
 SYDNOR, supra note 34, at 2. 
60
 Although “Thomas Edison had invented a means of recording and 
replaying sounds in 1877,” the technologies for reproducing sound recordings 
did not become commercially viable or widely adopted by consumers for years 




 Austin, supra note 58, at 117; see also Stan J. Liebowitz, The Elusive 
Symbiosis: The Impact of Radio on the Record Industry, 1 REV. ECON. RES. ON 
COPYRIGHT ISSUES 93, 107 (2004) (noting that by 1923, there were more than 
500 commercial radio stations operating in the United States).  
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sound-recording technologies, to the point where “record players 
became sufficiently convenient and inexpensive to become 
standard consumer goods.”63 These developments, in turn, gave 
rise to the modern recording industry, as consumers began 
purchasing pre-recorded music for private enjoyment.64 Because 
sound recordings were not protected under the Copyright Act of 
1909, recording artists and record labels were forced to rely on 
state common law to protect their recordings from unwanted radio 
play and duplication.65 However, these laws varied from one state 
to another, resulting in a patchwork of legislation and judicial 
rulings.66 Any rights granted to musicians had to be enforced on a 
state-to-state basis, and were thus largely ineffective in the fight 
against the unauthorized distribution and airplay of records.67 
Relying on the protection of state common law became even more 
                                                 
63
 SYDNOR, supra note 34, at 2. 
64
 Id.; see also Shourin Sen, The Denial of a General Performance Right in 
Sound Recordings: A Policy That Facilitates Our Democratic Civil Society?, 21 
HARV. J.L. & TECH. 233, 247 (2007) (noting that, by 1946, independent record 
labels were producing fifty million records per year). 
65
 See Sen, supra note 64, at 238 (noting that, under a strict reading of the 
Copyright Act of 1909, a person could legally make copies of a recording, so 
long as they compensated the composer of the underlying musical composition). 
In practice, however, performers were given limited protection in a number of 
U.S. states. 
66
 See, e.g., Capitol Records, Inc. v. Mercury Records Corp., 221 F.2d 657 
(2d Cir. 1955) (holding that the sale of sound recordings did not extinguish the 
common law copyright and that the recordings are protectable under state law); 
RCA Manufacturing Co. v. Whiteman, 114 F.2d 86 (2d Cir. 1940) (deciding not 
to protect sound recordings, finding that printing "Not Licensed for Radio 
Broadcast" on records was not sufficient to prevent radio stations from 
broadcasting a record that they had bought, and that performers retained their 
common law copyright only if the sound recordings were not distributed or 
sold); Waring v. WDAS Broadcasting Station, Inc., 194 A. 631 (Pa. 1937) 
(holding  that there was a protectable state right in sound recordings that were 
deemed "novel and artistic"); see also Jonathan Franklin, Pay To Play: Enacting 
a Performance Right in Sound Recordings in the Age of Digital Audio 
Broadcasting, 10 U. MIAMI ENT. & SPORTS L. REV. 83, 89–90 (1993). 
67
 Franklin, supra note 66, at 89–90. 
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problematic as the cost of sound recordings declined, and 
advancements were made with respect to duplicating 
technologies.68 In response, recording artists and record labels 
lobbied for “the sort of federal copyright protection long enjoyed 
by songwriters.”69 
D. Limited Protection Granted to Performers Under The Sound 
Recordings Act of 1971  
Not until 1971 did Congress finally respond to the 
increasing prevalence of recording piracy. They did so by enacting 
the Sound Recordings Act (SRA), which extended, for the first 
time, copyright protection to sound recordings.70 The SRA, which 
came into effect in 1972, gave limited protection to sound 
recording copyright owners by granting statutory protection 
against the duplication of recordings.71 Following this enactment, 
sound recording copyright owners held the exclusive rights to 
reproduce, distribute, and adapt their work.72 Importantly, 
however, the public performance right was specifically withheld.73 
As such, radio stations were allowed to continue broadcasting 
records without providing any compensation to sound recording 
copyright owners. Artists and labels thus continued to miss out on 
the compensation being realized by compositional copyright 
                                                 
68
 SYDNOR, supra note 34, at 2. 
69
 Id.  
70
 Pub. L. No. 92-140, 85 Stat. 391 (1971) [hereinafter Sound Recording 
Act of 1971].  
71
 Bonneville Int’l Corp. v. Peters, 347 F.3d 485, 487 (3d Cir. 2003) 
(maintaining that “with the Sound Recording Amendment of 1971…a limited 
copyright in the reproduction of sound recordings was established in an effort to 
combat recording piracy”); see also Sen, supra note 64, at 238. 
72
 Sound Recording Act of 1971, supra note 70, at § 1(a). 
73
 Bonneville Int’l Corp. v. Peters, 347 F.3d 485, 487 (3d Cir. 2003). 
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owners, who had long been paid by broadcasters for the public 
performance of their songs.74  
The absence of a full performance right for sound recording 
copyright owners reflects the political influence of two groups: 
broadcasters,75 and music composers and publishers.76 Throughout 
the history of radio, broadcasters have been a dominant force in the 
fight against granting performance rights in sound recordings.77 
Concerned about the financial implications of having to pay 
royalties to sound recording copyright owners—on top of what 
they already pay to songwriters—traditional radio broadcasters 
have, for decades,78 lobbied strongly to maintain the status quo. 
Traditional radio broadcasters have thus far succeeded in 
preventing sound recording owners from gaining full, exclusive 
performance rights in copyrighted works.79  
Owners of compositional copyrights, meanwhile, have also 
been particularly vocal in their opposition to a full public 
performance right for sound recordings. Songwriters and 
publishers—and the Performance Rights Organizations (PROs)80 
who represent them—believe that there would be little to gain, and 
much to lose, if the United States were to grant full public 
performance rights to sound recordings. Their chief concern is that, 
                                                 
74
 Noh, supra note 17, at 88.  
75
 Sen, supra note 64, at 237.  
76
 Mary La France, From Whether to How: The Challenge of Implementing 
a Full Public Performance Right in Sound Recordings, 2 HARV. J. SPORTS & 
ENT. L. 221, 222 (2011).  
77
 Noh, supra note 17, at 89.  
78
 Id. (noting that “broadcasters . . . have proven to be a formidable 
opponent [to the implementation of a full public performance right for sound 
recordings] over the decades.”).  
79
 Andrey Spektor, How “Choruss” Can Turn Into a Cacophony: The 
Record Industry’s Stranglehold on the Future of Music Business, 16 Rich. J.L. 
& Tech. 3, ¶ 9 (2009), available at http://jolt.richmond.edu/v16i1/article3.pdf.  
80
 For an explanation of PROs, see supra note 48.  
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should such a right be granted, the enforcement efforts of sound 
recording copyright owners would interfere with their own ability 
to commercially exploit their copyrighted compositions to the full 
extent possible.81 That is, composers fear that the sound recording 
copyright owners would “act as gatekeepers, potentially vetoing 
exploitation opportunities for the copyright compositions 
embodied in their sound recordings.”82 Moreover, composition 
copyright owners fear that any royalties paid by users to the sound 
recording copyright owners would reduce their own revenue 
stream.83 Why share the pie, when you can eat it all yourself?   
The heavy resistance put forward by the alliance between 
broadcasters and PROs successfully blocked the imposition of a 
sound recording performance right—not only under the SRA in 
1971, but also under the subsequent Copyright Act of 1976.84 
Despite strong lobbying by performing artists, who wanted the 
same performance rights as those granted to musical works, 
Congress could not be swayed.85 During the legislative processes 
leading up to the passage of these Acts, it became clear that the 
alleged positive impact that radio play has on record sales was the 
main justification for denying a public performance right for sound 
recordings.86  
                                                 
81
 La France, supra note 76, at 222.  
82
 Id.  
83
 Id.  
84
 Day, Super Brawl, supra note 40, at 184.  
85
 Noh, supra note 17, at 91. Note also that the Copyright Office, as far 
back as 1978, has publicly recognized the need for a public performance right in 
sound recordings. See also, Performance Rights in Sound Recordings: Hearings 
Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties and the Admin. of Justice of the 
H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th Cong. 117 (1978).  
86
 Noh, supra note 17, at 91. 
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E. The Relationship Between the Radio Industry and Record Sales 
The argument put forward by broadcasters in their 
opposition to a full public performance right for sound recordings 
has remained unchanged for years. Led by the powerful lobby 
group, the National Association of Broadcasters (NAB), they have 
continually convinced Congress that radio airplay amounts to free 
advertising for sound recordings.87 According to this argument, if a 
consumer hears a new song on the radio, the likelihood of that 
individual later purchasing that music increases.88 That is, a 
symbiotic relationship is said to exist between record labels and 
broadcasters.89 In exchange for the free use of sound recordings, 
broadcasters provide record labels and performers with free 
promotion.90 Any additional payment to sound recording copyright 
owners, broadcasters argue, would represent an unwarranted 
handout.91 Some have gone as far as to suggest that record labels 
and performers should pay broadcasters for their advertising 
services.92 The validity of this argument, as will be explained 
below in Part VI, is questionable. Nonetheless, it has proven to be 
persuasive. “[T]he 1971 Sound Recording Act would remain the 
                                                 
87
 Day, Super Brawl, supra note 40, at 194. 
88
 See U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Copyright Law 
Revision: S. Rept 93-983 on S. 1361, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., 1974 at 225–26 
(1974) (noting that “for years, record companies have gratuitously provided 
records to stations in hope of securing exposure by repeated play over the air. 
The financial success of recording companies and artists who contract with these 
companies is directly related to the volume of record sales, which in turn 
depends in great measure on the promotion efforts of broadcasters”). 
89
 Vanessa Van Cleaf, A Broken Record: The Digital Millennium Copyright 
Act’s Statutory Royalty Rate-Setting Process Does Not Work For Internet Radio, 
40 STETSON L. REV. 341, 355 (2010).  
90
 Erich Carey, We Interrupt This Broadcast: Will the Copyright Royalty 
Board’s March 2007 Rate Determination Proceedings Pull the Plug on Internet 
Radio?, 19 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 257, 264–65 (2008).  
91
 Sen, supra note 64, at 237.  
92
 Id.  
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sole legislation protecting sound recordings for the next twenty-
five years.”93 
III. THE RISE OF THE INTERNET & WEBCASTING 
A. The Internet Turns the Music Industry on its Head  
The advent of the Internet in the 1990s drastically changed 
the way that consumers listen to music. By introducing consumers 
to a myriad of new ways to access music, the Internet has shifted 
the balance of powers among music industry players, greatly 
affecting the once almighty record labels.94 Music lovers can now 
listen to and obtain their favorite songs online, without having to 
purchase full albums.95 Moreover, as advancements in high speed 
Internet access are made, Internet users are increasingly able to 
access digital content instantaneously. With the click of a button, 
users can listen to music whenever, and from wherever, they 
choose.96 The ability to instantly access a vast and constantly 
growing catalogue of music from distant locations has been 
referred to as the “celestial jukebox.”97  
 Internet radio is the non-interactive, continuous transmission 
                                                 
93
 Rick Marshall, The Quest For “Parity”: An Examination of the Internet 
Radio Fairness Act, 60 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 445, 450 (2013). 
94
 Rights holders, such as record labels, typically make a great effort to 
combat the unauthorized distribution of their works. However, as the Internet 
changes the way that people listen to music, record labels have increasingly 
been embracing websites such as YouTube, which, despite hosting large 
amounts of copyright infringing content, can help to advance the interests of the 
record labels and artists. Jay Patel, Viral Videos: Medicine for Record Labels in 
the Fight Against Copyright Termination?, 32 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 47, 52 
(2012). 
95
 Bagdanov, supra note 30, at 136. 
96
 Michael P. Kella, Arista Records v. Launch Media: An Analysis of the 
Second Circuit’s Ruling on Webcast Interactivity and a Look at the Current and 
Future State of Interactive Webcasting Technology,  30 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. 
REV. 199, 200 (2010).  
97
 Id.  
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of music or other audio programming on the Internet. In essence, a 
webcast is the Internet equivalent of a broadcast. It is “the 
transmission of a digital audio or video file via the Internet to one 
or more persons who view or listen to the file without downloading 
(permanently saving) it.”98 To send music to listeners, webcasters 
use a technology known as “streaming.” This process involves 
dividing a streamed song into small packets of information, each of 
which is likely to take a different route from the servers of the 
streaming service to the user’s computer.99 Because the travel time 
needed for each song fragment may vary, the user’s computer will 
collect and reconstruct the first several seconds of the song in a 
form of temporary RAM storage known as a “buffer.”100 Once a 
user’s computer has collected and reconstructed the first several 
seconds of a song, the computer begins to play the music. 
Meanwhile, the computer continues to receive additional streams 
of song fragments, thus keeping the buffer full, and the song 
playing.101 The process is repeated until the entire song has played.  
 The key difference between downloading and streaming a 
song is what occurs when the transmission reaches the user’s 
computer.102 When a user downloads a song, a copy of that song 
will remain on the user’s computer until the user chooses to erase 
it. Streams, on the other hand, are designed to be used once and 
then discarded.103 Unlike when music is downloaded, when a song 
                                                 
98
 Stockment, supra note 26, at 2132.  
99
 W. Jonathan Cardi, Über-Middleman: Reshaping the Broken Landscape 




 Amy Duvall, Royalty Rate-Setting For Webcasters: A Royal(ty) Mess, 
15 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 267, 268 (2008).  
102
 Cardi, supra note 99, at 860.  
103
 Duvall, supra note 101, at 269. Note that downloading a song clearly 
implicates the reproduction right of both layers of the song’s copyright, but does 
not implicate the public performance right unless simultaneous streaming occurs 
while downloading (i.e. listening to the song via streaming while downloading 
it). Streaming transmissions, on the other hand, implicate the public 
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is streamed, the user’s computer does not retain a copy of the 
sound recording. Once a streamed song fragment has been played, 
it is erased and replaced in the buffer by a yet-unperformed 
fragment.104 When the song has finished playing, the buffer is left 
empty. In order to hear the song again, the user would have to 
initiate another transmission and performance from the streaming 
service’s website.105  
B. Digital Audio Technology Strikes Fear Into the Hearts of the 
Recording Industry 
 The rapid growth in digital audio technology became a 
major concern for the recording industry. By 1995, digital 
transmissions of musical recordings were being offered to 
subscribers on the Internet.106 The recording industry feared that, 
as Internet data transmission speeds increased over time, this 
technological development would drastically undermine their 
business model. The labels believed that if consumers could 
eventually get music on-demand through an interactive, digital 
service, they would stop purchasing traditional records.107 
Specifically, the alternative market offered by the Internet was 
thought to have the potential to cut out the recording industry's 
products and erode their profits, ultimately inhibiting the creation 
of new music.108 A reduction in the amount of music produced 
                                                                                                             
performance right of both layers of the song, but not the reproduction right. See 
Spektor, supra note 79, at 30.  
104




 H.R. REP. NO. 104-274, at 12 (1995); see also Arista Records, L.L.C. v. 
Launch Media, Inc., 578 F.3d 148, 153 (2d Cir. 2009) (noting that data 
transmission over the Internet at this time was very slow (downloading a song 
took an average of twenty minutes in 1994), but the recording industry foresaw 
the potential of the Internet to threaten its business model as bandwidth 
increased). 
107
 H.R. REP. NO. 104-274, at 13 (1995). 
108
 Bonneville Int’l Corp. v. Peters, 347 F.3d 485, 488 (3d Cir. 2003). 
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would in turn harm consumers, who would be left with less variety 
to choose from.  
In addition to offering a convenient, legal market to 
purchase and listen to music, the Internet also greatly increased the 
likelihood that copyrighted works would be used unlawfully.109 
Not only did early online digital transmissions offer sound quality 
far superior to that of analog recordings broadcast over terrestrial 
radio, they were also much more convenient to bootleg. As such, 
the recording industry foresaw that the risk of unauthorized 
copying of songs streamed over the Internet would be far more 
dangerous than the risk of recordings made from terrestrial 
radio.110 Because one could record a streamed song that had sound 
quality as good as—or substantially similar to—CD quality,111 the 
Recording Industry Association of America (RIAA)112 “viewed 
on-demand radio as a potential market replacement for album 
sales.”113  
The advent of digital music transmissions brought the issue 
of performance rights to the forefront, drawing “attention to the 
disparity in the royalties received by performers who wrote their 
material and those who did not.”114 Historically, performers—
                                                 
109
 See Lauren E. Kilgore, Guerrilla Radio: Has the Time Come for a Full 
Performance Right in Sound Recordings?, 12 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 549, 
562 (2010) (noting that, as early as 1994, the issue of online music piracy began 
to make national headlines). 
110
 Id. at 563.  
111
 Gregory F. Donahue, The Sky Is Not Falling: The Effect of a 
Performance Right on the Radio Market, 87 IND. L.J. 1287, 1291 (2012).  
112
 The RIAA is “the trade organization that supports and promotes the 
creative and financial vitality of the major music companies.” Who We Are, 
RIAA, http://www.riaa.com/aboutus.php?content_selector=about-who-we-are-
riaa (last visited Apr. 13, 2014).  
113
 Kilgore, supra note 109, at 562.  
114
 Sen, supra note 64, at 265.  
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although not possessing a public performance right115—have been 
paid a royalty by their record label when their physical records are 
purchased at record stores.116 With the arrival of digital audio 
technology and illegal bootlegging, however, the public gained 
“on-demand access to a performer’s material without having to 
purchase a hardcopy.”117 The possibility thus arose that, as sales 
decreased, record labels—and, consequently, performers—would 
be left entirely uncompensated. This was due in part to the fact that 
digital transmissions were seen as being “legally equivalent to a 
public performance rather than to the purchase of a physical 
album.”118 In other words, digital technology created a loophole 
that enabled consumers to access music without any compensation 
landing in the pockets of the labels and artists. Record labels, 
represented by the RIAA, made compelling arguments before 
Congress that, in light of these technological developments, the 
traditional licensing structure failed to adequately protect and 
compensate artists.119 Under pressure from the recording industry, 
                                                 
115
 See Spektor, supra note 79, at 24.    
116
 Royalties paid to artists typically range between 8% and 25% of the 
suggested retail price of the recording. As there is no statutorily imposed fee that 
labels must pay artists, the royalty that the artist and label ultimately agree on in 
the recording contract depends on the clout of the artist. Moreover, record labels 
are notorious for using various sly accounting methods to reduce the amount of 
money that they must pay the artist. For example, labels typically make 
deductions for such things as packaging, breakage, giveaways, and returns. 
Lastly, labels generally withhold the royalties owed to the artist until all 
advances and costs incurred by the label are recouped. It is estimated that, after 
all is said and done, the royalty paid to the artist yields significantly less than 
10% of the wholesale record price. See generally Spektor, supra note 79.    
117
 Sen, supra note 64, at 265.  
118
 Id.  
119
 Day, Super Brawl, supra note 40, at 184. Note that, in 1995, the NAB 
joined the RIAA to lobby for a limited performance right for sound recording 
owners. They did so in an effort to handicap webcasters (who the NAB saw as 
potential new competitors) with an additional licensing requirement and cost. 
The NAB argued that the right should be limited to digital transmissions, 
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Congress decided to reevaluate whether a performance right for 
sound recordings should be granted.  
C. The DPRA 
In 1995, Congress enacted the Digital Performance Right in 
Sound Recording Act of 1995 (DPRA).120 The DPRA benefitted 
sound recording copyright owners by adding them to the list of 
protectable rights found in 17 U.S.C. § 106.121 Specifically, it 
granted sound recording copyright owners the exclusive right to 
license the performance of their copyrighted works publicly by 
means of a digital audio transmission. The DPRA was meant to 
address the record industry’s concerns that “the advance of digital 
recording technology and the prospect of digital transmission 
capabilities created the possibility that consumers would soon have 
access to services whereby they could pay for high quality digital 
audio transmissions (subscription services) or even pay for specific 
songs to be played on demand (interactive services).”122 Congress 
wanted to ensure that those whose livelihoods depended on 
effective copyright protection for sound recordings would “be 
protected as new technologies affect the ways in which their 
creative works are used.”123 
Although the DPRA established an exclusive digital 
transmission right for sound recording copyright holders, the right 
was narrow in scope, and riddled with exceptions. The two 
important exceptions carved out were the § 114(d)(1) limited 
                                                                                                             
thereby continuing the exemption enjoyed by traditional broadcasters. See 
Carey, supra note 90, at 266.  
120
 DPRA 1995, supra note 24.  
121
 See 17 U.S.C. § 106(6) (2012) (“The owner of copyright under this title 
has the exclusive rights to do and to authorize any of the following . . . . In the 
case of sound recordings, to perform the copyrighted work publicly by means of 
a digital audio transmission.”). 
122
 Bonneville Int’l Corp. v. Peters, 347 F.3d 485, 488 (3d Cir. 2003). 
123
 S. REP. NO. 104-128, at 10 (1995).  
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public performance right124 and the § 114(d)(2) compulsory (or 
‘statutory’) license.125 These exceptions reflected compromises 
worked out among the competing stakeholders; namely, sound 
recording copyright holders, radio broadcasters, PROs, and music 
publishers.126 The right was thus limited to: 
“(1) transmissions, as opposed to live 
performances (thereby exempting concerts, 
restaurants, dances, amusement parks, etc.); (2) of 
audio works, as opposed to audiovisual works 
(thereby exempting transmissions of movies); (3) 
that occur in digital format, as opposed to analog 
(thereby exempting contemporaneous AM and FM 
radio stations, and contemporaneous TV stations as 
well).”127 
                                                 
124
 17 U.S.C. § 114(d)(1) (2012) (exempting certain non-interactive 
transmissions and retransmissions, such as non-subscription broadcast 
transmissions and certain retransmissions of non-subscription broadcast 
transmissions); see also DPRA 1995, supra note 24. In its original wording, the 
DPRA stated that “the performance of a sound recording publicly by means of a 
digital audio transmission, other than as a part of an interactive service, is not an 
infringement of § 106(6) if the performance is part of (A)(i) a non-subscription 
transmission other than a retransmission; (ii) an initial non-subscription 
retransmission made for direct reception by members of the public of a prior or 
simultaneous incidental transmission that is not made for direct reception by 
members of the public; or (iii) a non-subscription broadcast transmission.” Id. 
This was later amended by the DMCA. See infra Part III.D.  
125
 17 U.S.C. § 114(d)(2) (2012); see Duvall, supra note 101, at 270 
(asserting that a statutory license is compulsory because it is automatically 
granted to the user of the copyright work so long as the user complies with 
certain requirements stipulated under the statute). Individual permission is not 
required from the copyright holder. Note that all services that did not fall within 
these two exceptions were required to “individually negotiate royalty rates with 
sound recording copyright holders.” Id. 
126
 2 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 
8.21[B] (Matthew Bender, Rev. Ed.); see also Duvall, supra note 101, at 270.  
127
 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 126, § 8.21[B]. 
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The DPRA created a complex, three-tiered system for 
categorizing license requirements into separate rates for: (1) non-
subscription broadcasters, (2) non-interactive subscription 
transmissions, and (3) interactive services.128 The licensing 
requirements for each of the three categories differed, with each 
being based on the extent to which the service would have an 
effect on record sales and the likelihood that infringing 
reproductions would be made.129  
First, non-subscription broadcasters are those not controlled 
or limited to certain recipients.130 Broadcasters falling into this 
category—including terrestrial radio stations—are subject to the § 
114(d)(1) limited public performance right. This is said to be the 
“most important exemption in the DPRA,”131 in that it completely 
exempts qualifying entities from “paying royalties to sound 
recording copyright owners for the performance of their works.”132 
That is, with the passage of the DPRA, terrestrial radio 
broadcasters were given the green light to continue playing records 
without having to compensate performers and record labels. 
Congress chose to uphold the royalty exemption for terrestrial 
radio stations, as it did not want to impose “new and unreasonable 
burdens on radio . . . broadcasters, which often promote, and 
appear to pose no threat to, the distribution of sound 
recordings.”133 Moreover, Congress did not specifically address 
                                                 
128
 DPRA 1995, supra note 24. 
129
 Bagdanov, supra note 30, at 142; see generally, Cardi, supra note 99.  
130
 S. REP. NO. 104-128, at 16 (1995).  
131
 Bagdanov, supra note 30, at 143.  
132
 Duvall, supra note 101, at 271. 
133
 Bonneville Int’l Corp. v. Peters, 347 F.3d 485, 488 (3d Cir. 2003) 
(quoting H.R. REP. NO. 104-274, at 14 (1995)). Congress also noted that it 
would be best to avoid “upsetting the longstanding business and contractual 
relationships among record producers and performers, music composers and 
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Internet radio technology in the DPRA, as webcasting was still an 
emerging technology at the time—its potential was severely 
restricted by slow Internet speeds.134 By failing to differentiate 
between terrestrial radio and Internet radio, webcasting and other 
non-subscription based music services offered online fell into this 
first category, and were thus exempt from the requirement to pay a 
royalty to sound recording copyright owners.135  
 Second, non-interactive subscription transmissions (e.g. 
digital cable and satellite radio136) are subject to the compulsory 
license found in § 114(d)(2).137 In order to provide subscription-
based music services, such entities are required to obtain the 
statutory license created under the DPRA.138 To do so, non-
interactive subscription services must comply with certain 
statutory conditions, which are set by an arbitration panel known 
as the Copyright Arbitration Royalty Panel (CARP), and adopted 
by the Librarian of Congress.139 For instance, the service cannot be 
                                                                                                             
publishers and broadcasters that have served all of these industries well for 
decades.” H.R. REP. NO. 104-274, at 12 (1995).  
134
 Kellen Myers, The RIAA, the DMCA, and the Forgotten Few 
Webcasters: A Call for Change in Digital Copyright Royalties, 61 FED. COMM. 
L.J. 431, 439 (2009) (noting that, when the DPRA was passed, the RIAA and 
Congress were most concerned about “audio on-demand” and “pay-per-listen” 
interactive services online, rather than webcasting or peer-to-peer services such 
as Napster).  
135
 Susan A. Russell, The Struggle Over Webcasting—Where is the Stream 
Carrying Us?, 1 OKLA. J.L. & TECH. 13, 13 (2004) (“The Act calls for royalty 
payment on digital audio transmissions offered through subscription services 
such as cable and satellite . . . DPRA does not address the “issue of webcasting 
or other nonsubscription based song services offered on the Internet.”). 
136
 Cable radio, which is similar in nature to cable television, delivers radio 
signals via coaxial cable. Satellite radio, on the other hand, involves the 
broadcast of signals from satellites in space. 
137
 17 U.S.C. § 114(d)(2) (2012). 
138
 Castro, supra note 27, at 3.  
139
 Duvall, supra note 101, at 271; see also Copyright Arbitration Royalty 
Panels (CARP), U.S. COPYRIGHT OFF., http://www.copyright.gov/carp/ (last 
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interactive, cannot pre-announce the broadcast of a particular song, 
must include information about the recording being broadcast, and 
is restricted in terms of the number of songs by a single artist and 
the number of songs on a single album that they can play per 
hour.140 If a non-interactive service provider fails to meet these 
requirements, they have the arduous task of negotiating privately 
with the sound recording copyright holder of each individual 
recording that they wish to play.141 Importantly, the DPRA 
stipulated that the compulsory license royalty rate would be set 
according to a four-part standard found in 17 U.S.C. § 801(b)(1),142 
and thus known as the 801(b) Standard. As will be seen below, the 
801(b) Standard plays a key role in the debate over sound 
recording public performance royalty rates.  
Third, interactive services are those that enable users to 
hear a particular song on-demand.143 Services that fall into this 
category include websites such as Rhapsody and Grooveshark,144 
                                                                                                             
visited Apr. 13, 2014) (stating “[t]he CARP system consisted of ad hoc 
arbitration panels that recommended the royalty rates and distribution of royalty 
fees collected under certain statutory licenses and set some of the terms and 
conditions of some of the statutory licenses. Each CARP was selected for a 
particular proceeding . . . and had up to 180 days to deliver its recommendation 
for the rate adjustment or distribution, as the case may be. With the enactment of 
the Copyright Royalty and Distribution Reform Act of 2004 (P.L. 108-419) on 
Nov. 30, 2004, the Copyright Arbitration Royalty Panel (CARP) system that had 
been part of the Copyright Office since 1993 was phased out. The Act replaced 
CARP with a system of the Copyright Royalty Board (CRB).”). 
140
 17 U.S.C. § 114(d)(2) (2012); DPRA 1995, supra note 24, § 3. 
141
 Bagdanov, supra note 30, at 143.  
142
 17 U.S.C. § 801(b)(1)(A)–(D) (2012). 
143
 La France, supra note 76, at 230.  
144
 Rhapsody is an online music store, launched in 2001, and available only 
in the United States. The service provides you with “the power to play exactly 
the songs you want, wherever you are.” What is Rhapsody?, RHAPSODY.COM, 
http://www.rhapsody.com/what-is-rhapsody/what-is-rhapsody.html (last visited 
Apr. 13, 2014). Grooveshark is an online music service that lets users choose 
particular songs to hear on request and create personalized song playlists. See 
GROOVESHARK, http://grooveshark.com/ (last visited Apr. 13, 2014). 
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which provide a list of available songs to be played immediately at 
the request of the user.145 Because these providers have the greatest 
potential for displacing record sales, Congress felt it necessary to 
tip the balance in favor of copyright holders. Consequently, 
“interactive services are responsible for the most stringent level of 
copyright licensing requirements.”146 Interactive services do not 
qualify for a compulsory license. Rather, the DPRA subjects them 
to an exclusive right, meaning that they must negotiate licenses 
with sound recording copyright holders for the on-demand 
transmission of copyrighted sound recordings.147 Copyright 
holders have the right to refuse to license their sound recordings to 
interactive music providers, thus keeping their works from 
appearing on such websites.  
                                                 
145
 Duvall, supra note 101, at 271 (noting that terrestrial radio stations that 
allow listeners to call in and request particular songs are not covered by this 
definition); see also Castro, supra note 27, at 3.  
146
 Bagdanov, supra note 30, at 142.  
147
 Castro, supra note 27, at 3–4.  
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Figure 2: The DPRA’s Three-Tiered Licensing Requirement 
System 
 
D. The DMCA 
Although the DPRA represented significant progress in the 
effort to protect the interests of sound recording copyright owners, 
it certainly had its shortcomings. As noted above, webcasters were 
not specifically included in the DPRA, leaving them exempt from 
paying public performance royalties. This omission did not sit well 
with those in the recording industry. In the years following the 
enactment of the DPRA, as streaming technologies continued to 
improve, the record industry grew increasingly concerned about 
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the DPRA’s inability to protect their interests.148 The RIAA 
complained that non-subscription webcasting services “diminished 
record sales, cut into profits, and hindered growth of the recording 
industry.”149 They battled with webcasters over whether such 
services should qualify for the limited public performance right or 
be labeled as an interactive service, thus requiring them to 
individually negotiate royalties with owners of copyrights in sound 
recordings.150 Ultimately, Congress sided—at least in part—with 
the recording industry, resulting in a series of amendments as part 
of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998 (DMCA).151  
The DMCA addressed the issue of royalties to be paid by 
webcasters for the public performance of sound recordings via 
digital audio transmissions.152 Importantly, it modified § 114(d)(1) 
of the Copyright Act by removing the royalty exemption for “a 
non-subscription transmission other than a retransmission,” under 
which non-interactive, non-subscription webcasts fell.153 By doing 
so, the DMCA expanded the class of transmissions that are subject 
to compulsory licenses.154 Namely, non-interactive, non-
subscription webcasters were shifted by Congress into the same 
                                                 
148
 Day, Super Brawl, supra note 40, at 185.  
149
 Bagdanov, supra note 30, at 144.  
150
 Duvall, supra note 101, at 272.  
151
 DMCA 1998, supra note 33.  
152
 Id. at 2890. Note that, while not a focus of this paper, one of the effects 
of the DMCA was to expand the § 112 exemption (which allows broadcasters to 
make “ephemeral recordings” in order to facilitate transmissions) to include 
ephemeral recordings that are made during the digital transmission of sound 
recordings. The § 112 compulsory license royalty, which is determined using the 
“willing buyer/willing seller” standard” (explained in Part IV.C of this paper), is 
insignificant in comparison to the § 114 performance royalty. The royalties for 
both licenses are typically determined together in a single rate. See Stockment, 
supra note 26, at 2139; see also 17 U.S.C. § 112(e) (2012). 
153
 Myers, supra note 134, at 441.  
154
 Bagdanov, supra note 30, at 145; see 17 U.S.C. § 114(j)(6), (7), (8), (11) 
(2012) (non-interactive services are divided into several categories under the 
DMCA, as explained in Part IV.D of this paper).  
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category as non-interactive subscription services,155 thus making it 
clear that “the compulsory license applied to all commercial, non-
interactive webcasting services, regardless of their revenue 
models.”156 Such webcasters became eligible for the statutory 
license, so long as they met certain criteria.157 Both terrestrial radio 
stations’ online rebroadcasts and “pure webcasters” thus clearly 
became subject to royalty payments for the music that they 
played.158 If a webcaster fails to comply with or qualify for the 
statutory license, it is required to obtain a license from the 
copyright holder for each song that it wishes to play.159 Congress 
did not give an explanation as to why it believed non-interactive, 
non-subscription services best fit into the newly expanded 
category.160 Nonetheless, the compulsory license arrangement 
alleviated the concerns of songwriters and music publishers, in that 
it prevented record companies from refusing to license their 
catalogues to non-interactive services.161 Interactive services, 
meanwhile, which present the highest risk for sale displacement,162 
remained ineligible for the statutory license.163  
                                                 
155
 Pals, supra note 31, at 683.  
156
 Marshall, supra note 93, at 452.  
157
 17 U.S.C. § 114(d)(2) (2012); see also Webcasting FAQ, RIAA, http://
web.archive.org/web/20021015121959/http://www.riaa.com/Licensing-Licen-
3a.cfm  (last visited Apr. 13, 2014). The conditions that a webcaster must meet 
in order to qualify for a statutory license include such things as: limiting the 
number of songs from a single album or artist that can be played within a three-
hour period (known as the “sound recording performance complement”); 
identifying the sound recording, album and featured artist of a song currently 
being played; employing available measures to ensure that the listener does not 
copy the music being broadcast over the Internet; and, refraining from 
announcing songs or playlists in advance.  
158
 17 U.S.C. § 114(d)(2) (2012); Spektor, supra note 79, at 10. 
159
 Russell, supra note 135, at 11.  
160
 Pals, supra note 31, at 683.  
161
 La France, supra note 76, at 231; see supra Part II.D.  
162
 See Arista Records, L.L.C. v. Launch Media, Inc., 578 F.3d 148, 154 
(2d Cir. 2009) (citing Jane C. Ginsburg, Copyright Legislation for the “Digital 
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An additional important aspect of the DMCA was that it 
amended the Copyright Act by broadening the definition of an 
“interactive service.”164 As webcasting technology improved, it 
became increasingly clear that the DPRA’s definition of 
“interactive service” was insufficient.165 Under the DPRA, 
interactive services were simply those that allowed a listener to 
request a specific sound recording.166 In some cases, however, 
users were able to select and rate particular artists, thus creating 
personalized programs in ways that were not anticipated by 
Congress when they defined “interactive” in the DPRA.167  
To close this loophole, the DMCA re-defined an interactive 
service as “one that enables a member of the public to receive a 
transmission of a program specially created for the recipient, or on 
request, a transmission of a particular sound recording, whether or 
not as part of a program, which is selected by or on behalf of the 
recipient.”168 Under this new definition, it is no longer required 
that the user personally choose what songs are played by the 
webcaster. As long as the user can influence the program in such a 
way that she might identify certain artists that then become the 
basis of her personal program, the service would be considered 
                                                                                                             
Millennium, 23 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 137, 167 (2009)). The court noted that the 
more advanced information a user has about the digital transmission, the more 
prepared they will be to make digital copies of the performances. Even if the 
user does not make an illegal copy of the performance, by listening to the 
interactive services, they are less likely to purchase copies of the sound 
recordings. See id. 
163
 Duvall, supra note 101, at 272.  
164
 Bagdanov, supra note 30, at 145.  
165
 Id.  
166
 Kella, supra note 96, at 213.  
167
 Steven M. Marks, Entering the Sound Recording Performance Right 
Labyrinth: Defining Interactive Services and the Broadcast Exemption, 20 LOY. 
L.A. ENT. L. REV. 309, 314 (2000). 
168
 17 U.S.C. § 114(j)(D)(7) (2012).  
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interactive under the statute.169 In other words, under the DMCA, 
“interactive services were deemed not only to be those that allowed 
users to request specific songs, but also those that provided a 
program of play created especially for the listener.”170  
 
 
Figure 3: Important Changes Under the DMCA 
 
IV. THE RATE DETERMINATION PROCEDURES 
The statutory rate determination procedures for providers 
of digital audio transmissions are both complex and controversial. 
In this Part, I will discuss these procedures in detail. This will 
                                                 
169
 Bagdanov, supra note 30, at 146. 
170
 Kella, supra note 96, at 213. 
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include an examination of how the rate determination methods 
have evolved over the past few years, and an analysis of the form 
that they take today.  
A. The Role of SoundExchange 
Statutory sound recording royalties from satellite radio, 
Internet radio, and digital cable music channels are paid to 
SoundExchange, a non-profit PRO designated as the sole entity in 
the United States authorized to collectively manage and distribute 
compulsory digital performance royalties.171 It does so on behalf of 
all sound recording copyright owners who join the organization. In 
addition, SoundExchange is responsible for negotiating on behalf 
of copyright owners in royalty rate setting proceedings.172 The 
money collected by SoundExchange is distributed to featured and 
non-featured recording artists, sound recording copyright owners 
(typically the record labels), and independent artists who own their 
own sound recording copyright.173 SoundExchange’s authority 
extends only to those digital music performances that qualify for 
statutory licensing; the organization does not have authority to 
negotiate or collect performance royalties on behalf of interactive 
services.174 Interestingly, SoundExchange is the brainchild of the 
                                                 
171
 17 U.S.C. § 114(g)(2)–(3) (2012); see About, SOUNDEXCHANGE, http://
www.soundexchange.com/about/ (last visited Apr. 13, 2014); see also 
Bagdanov, supra note 30, at 147.  
172
 Stockment, supra note 26, at 2140.  
173
 Spektor, supra note 79, at 23 (SoundExchange divides payments 
according to a consistent formula whereby the record company receives 50%, 
the featured artist receives 45%, and the remaining 5% is paid to the unions 
representing the non-featured musicians and non-featured vocalists); see La 
France, supra note 76, at 232 (noting that, in order to make accurate 
disbursements, SoundExchange must identify the specific recordings that have 
been played by each music service, and how often they have been played). To 
facilitate this requirement, 17 U.S.C. § 114(d)(2)(A)(iii) (2012) sets out that, if 
technologically feasible, each sound recording should be encoded with certain 
information, including the names of the featured performers.  
174
 Day, Super Brawl, supra note 40, at 205.  
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recording industry,175 having been created as an internal division of 
the RIAA in 2000, before being established as an independent non-
profit organization in September 2003.176  
B. The 801(b) Standard 
As noted above in Part III, the DPRA stipulated that the 
compulsory license royalty rate would be set according to the 
801(b) Standard.177 This standard seeks to balance the interests of 
all three parties to the copyright system: the public, copyright 
owners, and copyright users.178 It directs CARP179 to set royalties 
so as to achieve four objectives: 
(A) To maximize the availability of creative 
works to the public. 
(B) To afford the copyright owner a fair return 
for his or her creative work and the copyright user a 
fair income under existing economic conditions. 
(C) To reflect the relative roles of the copyright 
owner and the copyright user in the product made 
available to the public with respect to relative 
creative contribution, technological contribution, 
                                                 
175
 Russell, supra note 135, at 13.  
176
 Stockment, supra note 26, at 2140.  
177
 The § 801(b) Standard was adopted as part of the Copyright Act of 
1976. In addition to being used to determine the rates for some digital audio 
broadcasts, as discussed above, the 801(b) Standard is also used to determine: (i) 
performance royalties for jukeboxes (17 U.S.C. § 116); and (ii) mechanical 
license royalties for making and distributing phonorecords of musical 
compositions (17 U.S.C. § 115). See, e.g., Spektor, supra note 79, at 15; 
Stockment, supra note 26, at 2164.  
178
 Stockment, supra note 26, at 2164. 
179
 In the DPRA, Congress stipulated that arbitrations of this kind are to be 
carried out by CARP. However, in 2004, the rate-setting process was re-
examined by Congress, and CARP was replaced by the Copyright Royalty 
Board (CRB), which currently sets royalty rates. See infra Part IV.G.  
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capital investment, cost, risk, and contribution to the 
opening of new markets for creative expression and 
media for their communication. 
(D) To minimize any disruptive impact on the 
structure of the industries involved and on generally 
prevailing industry practices.180 
   
 The first and second policy objectives are fairly self-
explanatory. They reflect the overriding purpose of copyright law; 
that is, to incentivize the production of creative works.181 The third 
policy objective, however, is slightly more complex. Because it 
requires consideration of “the relative roles of the copyright owner 
and the copyright user” with respect to such things as “capital 
investment, cost, risk, and contribution to the opening of new 
markets,” it has the ability to exert downward pressure on rates.182 
This is due to the fact that copyright users (i.e. the digital audio 
services) often make larger investments, relative to the copyright 
owners.183 The fourth policy objective, meanwhile, is the most 
important of the four. It directs the arbitration panel to avoid 
setting rates that would threaten to disrupt the “prevailing industry 
                                                 
180
 17 U.S.C. § 801(b)(1) (2012). 
181
 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (providing Congress with the power to 
“promote the progress of science and useful arts, by securing for limited times to 
authors and inventors the exclusive right to their respective writings and 
discoveries”). Note that the willing buyer/willing seller standard does not take 
this overriding goal of copyright law into consideration. See infra Part IV.C. 
182
 John Villasenor, Digital Music Broadcast Royalties: The Case for a 




 Id. For example, the cost of establishing and maintaining satellite 
technology may warrant a discount from the market rate.  
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practices” of those using the copyrighted works. This final factor 
has the greatest potential to influence royalty rates.184  
C. Going From the 801(b) Standard to the Willing Buyer/Willing 
Seller Standard 
Importantly, when the DMCA was enacted, Congress opted 
to dispense with the 801(b) Standard for determining the 
compulsory royalty rate. In its place, the DMCA introduced what 
is known as the “willing buyer/willing seller” standard.185 The 
DMCA mandates that, when webcasters and copyright owners are 
unable to agree on a negotiated royalty rate, CARP is to use this 
standard to “establish rates and terms that most clearly represent 
the rates and terms that would have been negotiated in the 
marketplace between a willing buyer and a willing seller.”186 When 
deciding the rates and terms, CARP is directed to:  
base [its] decision on economic, competitive 
and programming information presented by the 
parties, including— 
(i) whether use of the service may substitute for 
or may promote the sales of phonorecords or 
otherwise may interfere with or may enhance the 
sound recording copyright owner’s other streams of 
revenue from its sound recordings; and  
(ii) the relative roles of the copyright owner and 
the transmitting entity in the copyrighted work and 
the service made available to the public with respect 
                                                 
184
 Id.  
185
 Stockment, supra note 79, at 2166 (also noting that the legislative 
history does not provide any explanation as to why Congress adopted this new 
standard for Internet radio).  
186
 17 U.S.C. § 114(f)(2)(B) (2012); DMCA 1998, supra note 33, at 2895–
96. 
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to relative creative contribution, technological 
contribution, capital investment, cost, and risk.187  
 
Replacing the 801(b) Standard with the willing 
buyer/willing seller standard threatened to drastically increase the 
royalty rates paid by digital broadcasters. This is because the 
willing buyer/willing seller standard, unlike the 801(b) Standard, 
lacks broad underlying policy considerations that have the 
potential to produce below-market rates. Naturally, digital satellite 
and digital cable services, fearing that a market-based rate would 
cause a major disruption to their business models, lobbied against 
any changes to the rates. By the time deliberations leading up to 
the DMCA took place, digital satellite and digital cable services 
“had amassed enough political support to oppose total adoption of 
the willing buyer/willing seller standard.”188 Much to the detriment 
of sound recording copyright holders, a two-tier royalty rate 
structure was thus born.189   
D. The Double Standard 
The two-tier royalty rate structure stems from the fact that, 
under the DMCA, services that provide non-interactive digital 
audio transmissions are divided into four categories, and are 
subject to two different rates. Companies that fall under the 
definition of “preexisting satellite digital audio radio service”190 
                                                 
187
 17 U.S.C. § 114(f)(2)(B)(i)–(ii) (2012). 
188




 17 U.S.C. § 114(j)(10) (2012). A “preexisting satellite digital audio 
radio service” is defined under the DMCA as follows: “a subscription satellite 
digital audio radio service provided pursuant to a satellite digital audio radio 
service license issued by the Federal Communications Commission on or before 
July 31, 1998, and any renewal of such license to the extent of the scope of the 
original license, and may include a limited number of sample channels 
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(e.g. Sirius XM) and those which provide a “preexisting 
subscription service”191 (e.g. digital cable radio services Music 
Choice and Muzak), are grandfathered to the 801(b) Standard. 
Meanwhile, services classified as “new subscription services,”192 
and those that broadcast “eligible non-subscription 
transmissions”193 (i.e. Internet radio) have their rates set according 
                                                                                                             
representative of the subscription service that are made available on a 
nonsubscription basis in order to promote the subscription service.” Id. 
191
 17 U.S.C. § 114(j)(11) (2012). A “preexisting subscription service” is 
defined under the DMCA as follows: “a service that performs sound recordings 
by means of noninteractive audio-only subscription digital audio transmissions, 
which was in existence and was making such transmissions to the public for a 
fee on or before July 31, 1998, and may include a limited number of sample 
channels representative of the subscription service that are made available on a 
nonsubscription basis in order to promote the subscription service.” Id.  
192
 17 U.S.C. § 114(j)(8) (2012). A “new subscription service” is defined 
under the DMCA as follows: “a service that performs sound recordings by 
means of noninteractive subscription digital audio transmissions and that is not a 
preexisting subscription service or a preexisting satellite digital audio radio 
service.” Id. Note that these services perform exactly the same function as 
“preexisting subscription services,” yet are subject to a less favorable royalty 
rate determination standard for the sole reason that they did not exist prior to 
1998. See David Oxenford, Another Proposed Settlement of Another Copyright 
Royalty Board Proceeding—New Subscription Services, BROADCAST L. BLOG 
(Nov. 9, 2007), http://www.broadcastlawblog.com/2007/11/articles/intellectual-
property/another-proposed-settlement-of-another-copyright-royalty-board-
proceeding-new-subscription-services/ (“The covered "new subscription 
services" have agreed to pay the greater of 15% of revenue or a per subscriber 
fee that will escalate over the 5 years that the agreement is in effect.”).  
193
 17 U.S.C. § 114(j)(6) (2012). An “eligible nonsubscription 
transmission” is defined under the DMCA as follows: “a noninteractive 
nonsubscription digital audio transmission not exempt under subsection (d)(1) 
that is made as part of a service that provides audio programming consisting, in 
whole or in part, of performances of sound recordings, including retransmissions 
of broadcast transmissions, if the primary purpose of the service is to provide to 
the public such audio or other entertainment programming, and the primary 
purpose of the service is not to sell, advertise, or promote particular products or 
services other than sound recordings, live concerts, or other music-related 
events.” Id. 
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to the willing buyer/willing seller standard.194 By modifying the 
categories in this way, the DMCA’s impact on royalty rates has 
been profound.195 Because of the substantially different policy 
objectives underlying the two standards, they naturally lead to 
drastically different royalty rates. In fact, the application of the two 
different standards to different services is “the single biggest factor 
in explaining the wide variations in rates paid today.”196 
The categorization of digital audio transmissions created 
under the DMCA limits access to the more favorable 801(b) 
Standard to digital broadcasters that were “preexisting” on July 31, 
1998. There is currently only a very small number of digital music 
broadcasting services that qualify under this standard: namely, 
Sirius XM, Music Choice, and Muzak.197 These services benefit 
greatly from having their royalty rate determined according to the 
flexible 801(b) Standard, rather than by the strict marketplace test 
of the willing buyer/willing seller standard.198 As will be shown 
below, the royalty rate that they pay is substantially lower than that 
which webcasters are subject to.  
                                                 
194
 Marshall, supra note 93, at 453; see Stockment, supra note 26, at 2164.  
195
 Villasenor, supra note 182, at 4–5.  
196
 Id. at 5.  
197
 Id. at 6; see Marshall, supra note 93, at 457.  
198
 See Carey, supra note 90, at 302. 
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Figure 4: The Two-Tier Royalty Rate Structure 
E. The CARP Procedures: Webcaster I 
Internet radio webcasts generally do not fall under the 
DMCA’s definition of “interactive service.”199 Rather, as noted 
above, they generally fall within the non-interactive category, thus 
making them eligible for the statutory license.200 To set the 
                                                 
199
 This precedent was established by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals 
in Arista, which determined how the “interactivity” provision of the DMCA 
applies to webcasting companies. Interactivity is gauged by the level of control 
the audience has in selecting or re-listening to specific tracks. See Arista 
Records, L.L.C. v. Launch Media, Inc., 578 F.3d 148, 164 (2d Cir. 2009); 
Bagdanov, supra note 30, at 146. 
200
 Spektor, supra note 79, at 18, 30; see Bagdanov, supra note 30, at 147 
(noting that the DMCA requires that Internet webcasters obtain licenses and pay 
royalties to the PROs (who represent the compositional copyright owners) and 
801(b) Standard
Preexisting Satellite 
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statutory royalty rate, the DMCA provides for voluntary 
negotiations between sound recording owners and digital music 
services.201 However, if voluntary negotiations fail to result in an 
agreement after a 60-day statutory period, the DMCA mandates 
that the DPRA’s CARP procedures should be used to set rates and 
terms for the compulsory license.202 Thus, it is only when industry-
wide negotiations fail to result in agreement that the parties are 
forced to litigate the rate before a government-appointed panel.203  
Following the enactment of the DMCA, a small number of 
webcasters reached voluntary licensing agreements with the RIAA. 
In order to determine an industry-wide rate for the remaining 
webcasters with whom negotiations had broken down, the RIAA, 
in 1999, petitioned the Librarian of Congress to convene CARP.204 
Several years later, in February 2002, CARP’s royalty rate 
determination (Webcaster I) was released.205 In Webcaster I, 
CARP adopted the RIAA’s proposal for a per-performance royalty 
model (i.e. every time a sound recording is streamed to a listener), 
rather than the webcaster-supported percentage-of-revenue 
                                                                                                             
to SoundExchange, which represents the owners of the sound recording 
copyrights). 
201
 DMCA 1998, supra note 33, at 2895–96; see Marshall, supra note 93, at 
453. 
202
 Duvall, supra note 101, at 272. 
203
 Marshall, supra note 93, at 453.  
204
 Carey, supra note 90, at 276–77.  
205
 Rate Setting for Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings and 
Ephemeral Recordings, Docket No. 2000-9 CARP DTRA 1 & 2 (Copyright Arb. 
Royalty Panel Feb. 20, 2002) [hereinafter Webcaster 1 CARP Report], available 
at http://www.copyright.gov/carp/webcasting_rates.pdf. CARP’s report 
recommended rates and terms for two compulsory licenses: (i) for eligible non-
subscription services to perform sound recordings publicly by means of digital 
audio transmissions (i.e. webcasting) under 17 U.S.C. § 114; and (ii) to make 
ephemeral recordings of sound recordings under the statutory license set forth in 
17 U.S.C. § 112. Id. at 1–2. The CARP recommendation set royalty rates for 
webcasters retroactively from October 1998 through until December 2002. Id. at 
2.  
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model.206 However, because some services at the time did not 
possess the requisite software or technical expertise to accurately 
calculate the number of individual performances, CARP adopted 
the RIAA’s recommendation to temporarily allow statutory 
licensees to reasonably estimate their usage of sound recordings.207 
As such, all commercial webcasters (who did not qualify as “small 
commercial webcasters”) were permitted to calculate royalties 
using an aggregate tuning hours (ATH) method, “whereby one 
listener who listens for one hour would constitute one aggregate 
tuning hour, two listeners who each listen for a half an hour would 
also be one aggregate tuning hour, and so on.”208  
The CARP royalty rate recommendations were as follows: 
0.07 cents per performance per listener for radio retransmissions 
by commercial webcasters,209 0.14 cents for Internet-only 
transmissions,210 and 0.02 cents per performance for non-
commercial webcasters.211 To arrive at its determination, CARP 
used a willing buyer/willing seller model based largely on a 
voluntary agreement reached between the RIAA and Yahoo!, Inc., 
which involved a lump sum payment of $1.25 million dollars for 
the first one and a half billion transmissions (including Internet-
only transmissions and radio retransmissions).212 CARP was fully 
                                                 
206
 Duvall, supra note 101, at 273.  
207
 Webcaster 1 CARP Report, supra note 205, at 109.  
208
 Cydney A. Tune, Webcaster Music Royalty Rates—In Flux and on the 




 Webcaster 1 CARP Report, supra note 205, at 84.  
210
 Id. at 88. CARP based the disparate price treatment between radio 
retransmissions and Internet-only transmissions on the conclusion that over-the-
air radio play has a “tremendous promotional impact on phonorecord sales” that 
Internet-only transmissions do not provide. See id. at 75.  
211
 Id. at 94. 
212
 Robert J. Delchin, Musical Copyright Law: Past, Present and Future of 
Online Music Distribution, 22 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 343, 376 (2004).  
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aware that implementing such high rates would eliminate many 
small and medium sized webcasters. In fact, the Panel stated that 
the webcasting community at the time had an over-abundance of 
“marginal and insignificant entities”213 and that increasing the rates 
was desirable in that it would bring about market consolidation. 
This in turn would result in a far smaller number of viable 
webcasters, all of which would be able to endure and prosper, and 
afford significantly higher royalty payments to copyright 
owners.214  
Not surprisingly, Webcaster I was “met with fierce 
opposition from small webcasters, who argued that the willing 
buyer/willing seller model used by CARP was far too broad to 
adequately differentiate between larger commercial webcasters 
such as Yahoo! and smaller mom-and-pop commercial 
webcasters.”215 To protest the new fees and accounting procedures, 
which small webcasters saw as having the potential to kill Internet 
radio, a “Day of Silence” was staged.216 The Librarian of 
Congress, who, at the time, was authorized to review CARP 
decisions, subsequently intervened in the matter, but largely 
adopted the Panel’s determinations. For instance, he agreed that 
the RIAA/Yahoo! deal served as the best model for an agreement 
that would have been negotiated in the marketplace between a 
willing buyer and willing seller.217 He disagreed, however, with 
CARP’s finding that royalty rates for Internet-only webcasters and 
webcasters who retransmitted radio broadcasts should be set 
differently.218 Consequently, he set a rate of 0.07 cents per 
                                                 
213




 Day, Super Brawl, supra note 40, at 188.  
216
 Duvall, supra note 101, at 275. 
217
 Determination of Reasonable Rates and Terms for the Digital 
Performance of Sound Recordings and Ephemeral Recordings, 67 Fed. Reg. 
45,240, 45,259 (July 8, 2002) (codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 261).  
218
 Id. at 45,255.  
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performance, per listener for all eligible non-subscription 
transmissions by commercial webcasters,219 and kept the rate for 
non-commercial webcasters at 0.02 cents per performance.220 
F. The Small Webcaster Settlement Act of 2002 
As expected, the high compulsory royalty rates imposed by 
Webcaster I forced many small commercial webcasters out of 
business.221 Others, desperate for change, petitioned Congress for 
help. In response to their pleas, Congress enacted the Small 
Webcaster Settlement Act of 2002 (SWSA).222 The SWSA 
provided non-commercial and small commercial webcasters223 
additional time to negotiate with sound recording copyright owners 
(represented by SoundExchange). This resulted in a compromise 
being reached in 2002, whereby commercial webcasters would pay 
rates based on a percentage of their gross revenue, while non-
commercial webcasters were to pay a flat annual fee, subject to a 
number of restrictions.224 The SWSA garnered general approval 




 Id. at 45,259. 
221
 Carey, supra note 90, at 278.  
222
 Small Webcaster Settlement Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-321, 116 Stat. 
2780 (2002). 
223
 Notification of Agreement Under the Small Webcaster Settlement Act 
of 2002, 67 Fed. Reg. 78,510, 78,513 (Dec. 24, 2002) (an “eligible small 
webcaster” is defined based on a revenue scale that is graduated by calendar 
year and, under the 2004 definition, a small webcaster is one whose revenues do 
not exceed $1.25 million per year); see Carey, supra note 90, at 280.  
224
 Notification of Agreement Under the Small Webcaster Settlement Act 
of 2002, 68 Fed. Reg. 35,008, 35,010 (June 11, 2003); see Day, Super Brawl, 
supra note 40, at 189. The SWSA created a special royalty option for small 
commercial entities (i.e. webcasters with less than $1.2 million in revenue), 
allowing them to pay the higher of (1) 10% of their revenue on the first 
$250,000 and 12% thereafter, or (2) 7% of their expenses. In addition, under the 
SWSA, other categories of webcasters, such as non-commercial and non-music 
webcasters, were subject to different rates than commercial webcasters. On the 
one hand, non-commercial webcasters were to pay a minimum rate of $500 a 
year, which allowed them to stream to an average of 200 simultaneous listeners 
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from both sides of the debate.225 Small webcasters and non-
commercial groups, in particular, felt that the Webcaster I rates 
would have put them out of business had it not been for the 
agreement reached under the SWSA.226 Finally, “after four years 
of negotiation, arbitration, and Congressional intervention, a 
temporary peace [had fallen] over the digital performance right 
battlefield.”227 However, in 2005, when the negotiated license 
terms came to an end, so did the period of relative calm. The brawl 
was set to begin anew.228   
G. The 2007 CRB Decision – Webcaster II 
Following the highly controversial rate setting procedure in 
Webcaster I, various parties complained to Congress about the 
CARP arbitration system.229 In order to appease webcasters’ 
requests to modify the statutory rate-setting process, Congress 
enacted the Copyright Royalty and Distribution Reform Act of 
2004.230 This Act replaced CARP with the Copyright Royalty 
                                                                                                             
or 146,000 aggregate monthly tuning hours (ATH). Once those limits are met, 
the non-commercial webcaster would pay royalties on any excess streaming, 
either on a per-performance basis (.0002176 cents per performance) or on the 
basis of aggregate tuning hours (.00251 cents per ATH). Non-music webcasters 
(i.e. those who primarily broadcast news, talk and/or sports), on the other hand, 
were to pay a reduced rate of .000762 cents per performance or per ATH. Tune, 
supra note 208, at 2.  
225
 Carey, supra note 90, at 279.  
226
 David D. Oxenford, Copyright Royalty Board Releases Music Royalties 
for Internet Radio Streaming for 2006-2010—Clarifying the Confusion, ALA. 
BROADCASTERS ASS’N, (Apr. 12, 2007), www.al-ba.com/crb.doc [hereinafter 
Oxenford April 2007].  
227
 Day, Super Brawl, supra note 40, at 189.  
228
 Id.  
229
 Carey, supra note 90, at 283 (the CARP was criticized for being made 
up of inexperienced decision-makers, and that the decisions were “unpredictable 
and inconsistent”).  
230
 17 U.S.C. § 801 (2012); see Marshall, supra note 93, at 454. 
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Board (CRB), a panel consisting of three full-time Copyright 
Royalty Judges.231  
 On February 16, 2005, the newly formed CRB commenced 
proceedings to determine new rates and terms for the § 114 
statutory license of sound recordings for webcasters.232 Just over 
two years later, on March 2, 2007, the Board released its first 
ruling (Webcaster II). The decision, which was to cover the 
licensing period from January 1, 2006 through December 31, 2010, 
proved to be highly controversial, resulting in significant backlash 
from webcasters.233 Despite Congress’ attempts to reform the 
royalty rate setting system by replacing CARP with the CRB, the 
result of Webcaster II “was eerily reminiscent” to that of 
Webcaster I.234 Whereas Webcaster I faced its strongest opposition 
                                                 
231
 Castro, supra note 27, at 4. The Copyright Royalty Board (CRB) 
determines rates and terms for the copyright statutory licenses and makes 
determinations on distribution of statutory license royalties collected by the 
Copyright Office. See U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, supra note 139. The Copyright 
Royalty Judges (CRJs) are full-time employees in the Library, and are appointed 
for six-year terms, with an opportunity for reappointment. Id. The first three 
judges serve two-, four- and six-year terms in order to avoid a situation where 
all three judges are replaced at the same time. Id. 
232
 In addition to setting rates and terms for the § 114 webcaster 
performance license, the CRB also set rates and terms for the § 112 ephemeral 
license. See Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings and Ephemeral 
Recordings, 72 Fed. Reg. 24,084, 24,085 (May 1, 2007) (codified at 37 C.F.R. 
pt. 380).  
233
 Bagdanov, supra note 30, at 147.  
234
 Oxenford April 2007, supra note 226, at 2–3. Under the CARP system, 
decisions regarding royalties were made by a panel of arbitrators. Id. The 
arbitration system was highly criticized by those who believed that the Panel— 
whose members could change after each royalty proceeding—lacked 
institutional knowledge. Id. Moreover, the process was very costly for 
participants, who were required to pay the costs of the arbitrators in the 
proceeding. Id. Whereas the CRB system allowed for continuity among the 
Judges sitting on the Board, and eliminated the costs of the arbitrators, it added 
discovery (document production, interrogatories and depositions) to the process. 
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from small webcasters and non-commercial groups, Webcaster II 
was met with vehement disapproval from virtually all webcasters 
involved in the proceedings.235 It was believed that the high 
royalties imposed by the CRB would quickly put many Internet 
radio stations—large and small, commercial and non-
commercial—out of business.236  
 As noted above, the SWSA spared webcasters from having 
to pay according to the per-performance royalty scheme 
recommended by CARP in Webcaster I. However, to the detriment 
of webcasters, the Webcaster II decision re-implemented a per-
performance royalty calculation system, drastically changing the 
methodology that was used to calculate royalty rates under the 
SWSA.237 The decision mandated that all commercial 
webcasters238—including those previously categorized as small 
commercial webcasters239 or non-music webcasters—would be 
required to calculate royalties at the same per-performance rate.240 
The new rates for all commercial webcasters were set as 
follows: .0008 cents per performance in 2006 (applied 
retroactively), .0011 cents per performance in 2007, .0014 cents 
per performance in 2008, .0018 cents per performance in 2009, 
and .0019 cents per performance in 2010.241 Moreover, the 
                                                                                                             
Id. Despite these changes, the CRB’s 2007 decision was very similar in result to 
CARP’s 2002 decision, and was thus highly criticized. Id. 
235
 Id.  
236
 Carey, supra note 90, at 284.  
237
 Tune, supra note 208, at 2. 
238
 See Bagdanov, supra note 30, at 148 n.108. “Commercial webcaster” is 
synonymous with “eligible nonsubscription transmission”; see also supra Part 
IV.D.  
239
 Tune, supra note 208, at 2 (Small commercial webcasters are those with 
less than $1.2 million in annual revenue). 
240
 Id. at 4.  
241
 Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings and Ephemeral 
Recordings, 72 Fed. Reg. 24,084, 24,096 (May 1, 2007) (to be codified at 37 
C.F.R. pt. 380).  
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decision set a minimum annual fee of $500 per “channel” or 
“station” for commercial broadcasters.242 The terms “channel” and 
“station,” however, were not clearly defined, creating some 
confusion with respect to services that create individualized 
playlists for listeners. If each stream were to be treated as a unique 
“channel,” those webcasters who produce a unique stream every 
time a listener logs into their site faced massive costs.243  
Year Fee Per Performance 
(U.S. dollars) 
Percent Increase 
Over Prior Year  
2006 .0008 - 
2007 .0011 38% 
2008 .0014 27% 
2009 .0018 29% 
2010 .0019 6% 
Figure 5: Webcaster II Performance Royalty Fee Schedule for 
Commercial Webcasters244 
Perhaps the most striking feature of Webcaster II was its 
treatment of small commercial webcasters. By eliminating the 
option under the SWSA that allowed small webcasters “to pay a 
percentage of their revenue in lieu of a per-performance royalty 
fee,”245 Webcaster II forced small webcasters to pay the same 
royalty rates as larger companies with deeper pockets.246 Non-
                                                 
242
 Id. at 24,097.  
243
 Oxenford April 2007, supra note 226, at 2.  
244
 Castro, supra note 27, at 5. 
245
 Id. at 6. 
246
 The CRB opted to eliminate the separate status for small webcasters 
under Webcaster I using the rationale that allowing “inefficient market 
participants to continue to use as much music as they want and for as long a time 
period as they want without compensating copyright owners on the same basis 
as more efficient market participants trivializes the property rights of copyright 
owners.” Moreover, the CRB noted that it “cannot guarantee a profitable 
business to every market entrant” and that “the normal free market processes 
52
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commercial webcasters,247 meanwhile, continued to be treated as a 
separate category under the CRB scheme. However, the basis on 
which they were to pay royalties changed. Webcaster II mandated 
that non-commercial webcasters would pay a minimum annual fee 
of $500 per channel or station, which allowed them to conduct 
digital audio transmissions of up to 159,140 ATH per month. 
Should a non-commercial webcaster exceed the limit in any given 
month, it would be required to pay additional royalties for digital 
audio transmissions in excess of the cap at the same rate as that 
paid by commercial webcasters.248 
To arrive at their royalty rate determination, the CRB, as 
directed by statute, applied the willing buyer/willing seller 
standard.249 First, they constructed the hypothetical marketplace in 
which the “buyers” and “sellers” negotiated a price for the 
“product.” The CRB defined “sellers” as record companies, the 
“buyers” as webcasters in a market where no compulsory license 
exists, and the “product” as a blanket license permitting the buyers 
to make digital audio transmissions of the record companies’ 
                                                                                                             
typically weed out those entities that have poor business models or are 
inefficient.” See Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings and Ephemeral 




 Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings and Ephemeral 
Recordings, 72 Fed. Reg. at 24,098 (Non-commercial webcasters are non-profit 
entities with the mission of providing “educational, cultural, religious and social 
programming not generally available on commercial venues.” Moreover, they 
“have different sources of funding than ad-supported commercial webcasters—
such as listener donations, corporate underwriting or sponsorships, and 
university funds.”); see Duvall, supra note 101, at 280; Bagdanov, supra note 
30, at 148.  
248
 Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings and Ephemeral 
Recordings, 72 Fed. Reg. at 24,100.  
249
 17 U.S.C. § 114(f)(2)(B) (2012). 
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complete repertoire of sound recordings.250 As a benchmark for 
setting the new rates, the CRB looked to an analysis of seventeen 
contracts between interactive webcasters and the recording 
industry.251 This evidence, which was presented by one of 
SoundExchange’s expert witnesses, was accepted despite the fact 
that it was based on services that are inherently different.252 As 
noted above, interactive services, which allow audiences to choose 
which songs will be played in a stream, do not qualify for statutory 
licensing, and must negotiate privately with record labels for the 
right to use their sound recordings. Whereas virtually all of the 
interactive services used to formulate the benchmark are 
subscription-based services, most of the non-interactive webcasters 
subject to the statutory rate are free, advertising-supported 
companies.253 Nonetheless, the CRB rejected arguments that 
interactive services were too dissimilar to be used as an appropriate 
benchmark, finding that the expert witness had appropriately 
adjusted for differences in interactivity.254 Namely, rates were 
adjusted to take into account the fact that non-interactive services 
offer less value to consumers, in that consumers are unable to 
select songs when using such a service.255 
                                                 
250
 Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings and Ephemeral 
Recordings, 72 Fed. Reg. at 24,087; see Mark D. Robertson, Sparing Internet 
Radio from the Real Threat of the Hypothetical Marketplace, 10 VAND. J. ENT. 
& TECH. L. 543, 545 (2008).  
251
 Castro, supra note 27, at 5. Note, however, that the CRB rejected 
proposals by webcasters to use as a benchmark the rates webcasters pay to PROs 
such as ASCAP and BMI for the digital performance of the musical 
compositions underlying sound recordings. The proposal was rejected on the 
basis that “evidence shows that sound recording rights are paid multiple times 
the amounts paid for musical works.” See 72 Fed. Reg. 24,084, supra note 232, 
at 24,094.  
252
 Carey, supra note 90, at 287–88. 
253
 Oxenford April 2007, supra note 226, at 3.  
254
 Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings and Ephemeral 
Recordings, 72 Fed. Reg. at 24,092.  
255
 Oxenford April 2007, supra note 226, at 3.  
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Not surprisingly, Webcaster II was met with immediate and 
fierce opposition. The rate increases were so dramatic that even the 
largest commercial webcasters, such as Yahoo! and Pandora, 
expressed intentions to shut down their businesses if the rates 
remained in effect.256 Pandora, for instance, which offers 
thousands of channels without subscription fees, faced the prospect 
of skyrocketing royalty bills under the new CRB rules. The 
company estimated that, in 2008 alone, it would be required to pay 
$18 million in royalties, out of its expected $25 million in 
revenue—not including separate royalties to be paid to 
songwriters.257 This figure would be enough to force the webcaster 
out of business.258 
Although large webcasters faced potential rate increases 
estimated at between 40% and 70% of revenues, it was small 
webcasters who were most affected by the CRB decision.259 It was 
estimated that small webcasters would face royalty increases 
equivalent to as much as 1200% of revenues, forcing most—if not 
all—out of business.260 Rather than account for the “disparate, 
nuanced financial realities of the evolving [webcasting] industry,” 
the CRB decision “subjected all webcasters to the same per-
performance royalty metric,” thus threatening to bury many of 
them “under the weight of the rate increase.”261 Webcasters argued 
that, during the two years of litigation leading up to Webcaster II, 
the significant rate increases advocated for by SoundExchange, 
and subsequently adopted by the CRB, were nothing more than a 
                                                 
256
 Meg Tirrell, Yahoo, AOL May Abandon Web Radio After Royalties Rise 
(Update2), BLOOMBERG (Nov. 28, 2007), http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/
news?pid=newsarchive&sid=a0pKOrcpw6yE.  
257
 Tim Bajarin, Saving Internet Radio, PC MAGAZINE (Oct. 3, 2008), http:/
/www.pcmag.com/article2/0,2817,2331595,00.asp.  
258
 Id.  
259




 Robertson, supra note 250, at 546. 
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“major label money grab—an attempt to revive a dying business 
model through exorbitant fee increases at the expense of 
technological developments and consumer interests.”262 
H. The Webcaster Settlement Act of 2008 and The Pureplay 
Agreement  
 Despite the swift and vehement objections to Webcaster II, 
the CRB, on April 16, 2007, issued an Order denying all requests 
for a rehearing.263 Several weeks later, on May 1, 2007, the Board 
issued its final determination, at which point the rates became 
immediately effective.264 In response to the rallying cries of 
webcasters, Congress, as it did following CARP’s controversial 
Webcaster I decision in 2002, opted to intervene. They did so by 
passing the Webcaster Settlement Act of 2008 (WSA 2008),265 
which sent the Digital Media Association (DiMA) (the national 
trade organization representing webcasters) into negotiations with 
SoundExchange.266 Under the WSA 2008, the parties were given 
until February 15, 2009, to negotiate royalty rates to replace the 
compulsory license rates determined by the CRB in Webcaster 
II.267 The WSA 2008 permitted parties to agree on royalty rates for 
                                                 
262
 Kevin C. Parks, Black Hole or Celestial Jukebox? Section 114 and the 
Future of Music, LANDSLIDE, Nov.–Dec. 2008, at 46, 49; Bagdanov, supra note 
30, at 149. 
263
 Tune, supra note 208, at 2–3. In the same Order, however, the CRB 
amended its initial decision, allowing for a transitional option for the years 2006 
and 2007, during which time webcasters could continue to use ATH as a basis 
for calculation of the royalties owed. Id. The CRB also set a July 15th, 2007, 
payment deadline for retroactive royalties for 2006, and refused to stay 
implementation of the new rates and terms until all administrative appeals and 
judicial review were complete. Id.  
264
 Stockment, supra note 26, at 2144.  
265
 Webcaster Settlement Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-435, 122 Stat. 4974 
(2008) (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. § 114) [hereinafter WSA of 2008].  
266
 Day, Super Brawl, supra note 40, at 191.  
267
 Bagdanov, supra note 30, at 151–52.  
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a period of up to eleven years, beginning on January 1, 2005.268 
Negotiations, however, failed to produce an agreement by the 
February 15, 2009, deadline,269 prompting Congress to issue the 
Webcaster Settlement Act of 2009 (WSA 2009),270 which amended 
the WSA 2008, and gave the parties thirty additional days to 
negotiate.271 The extension granted under the WSA 2009 provided 
enough time for SoundExchange and many webcasters, including 
Pandora, to successfully reach an agreement (Pureplay 
Agreement).272  
 The Pureplay Agreement was concluded between 
SoundExchange and a group of webcasters on July 7, 2009.273 It 
set rates for the period beginning on January 1, 2006, and ending 
on December 31, 2015,274 and is available as an alternative to the 
Webcaster II rates to any commercial webcaster who meets the 
eligibility conditions of the agreement and chooses to opt-in.275 
Namely, eligible webcasters must qualify as “pureplay 
webcasters”—that is, “those that are willing to include their entire 
gross revenue in a percentage of revenue calculation to determine 
                                                 
268
 WSA of 2008, supra note 265, at § 2.  
269
 Bagdanov, supra note 30, at 152.  
270
 Webcaster Settlement Agreement of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-36, 123 Stat. 
1926 (codified as amended in 17 U.S.C. § 114) [hereinafter WSA 2009].  
271
 Id. at § 2.  
272
 Notification of Agreements Under the Webcaster Settlement Act of 
2009, 74 Fed. Reg. 34,796 (July 17, 2009) [hereinafter Pureplay Agreement]; 
see Day, Super Brawl, supra note 40, at 191; David Oxenford, Pureplay 
Webcasters and SoundExchange Enter Into Deal Under Webcaster Settlement 
Act to Offer Internet Radio Royalty Rate Alternative for 2006-2015, BROADCAST 
L. BLOG (July 7, 2009), http://www.broadcastlawblog.com/2009/07/articles/
internet-radio/pureplay-webcasters-and-soundexchange-enter-into-deal-under-
webcaster-settlement-act-to-offer-internet-radio-royalty-rate-alternative-for-
2006-2015 [hereinafter Oxenford July 7].  
273
 Pureplay Agreement, supra note 272, at 34,797.  
274
 Id. at 34,798. 
275
 Id. at 34,797. 
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their royalties”276 and “whose primary business is to transmit 
sound recordings under the statutory license, and not to sell or 
promote any other service or product.”277 The Pureplay Agreement 
creates royalty rates for three separate categories: (1) “commercial 
webcasters” (those with annual revenues of $1.25 million or more), 
(2) “small pureplay webcasters” (commercial webcasters with 
$1.25 million or less in revenue), and (3) “subscription services” 
(webcasters that charge a subscription fee for access).278   
For commercial webcasters, the rates under the Pureplay 
Agreement are far preferable to those under Webcaster II.279 Under 
the new deal, these large webcasters must pay SoundExchange the 
greater of 25% of gross revenue or a per performance royalty rate 
starting at .0008 cents per play in 2006 and increasing to .0014 
cents per play in 2015.280 Despite being a better deal than 
Webcaster II, commercial webcasters that opt-in to the Pureplay 
Agreement are still subject to extremely high royalty burdens. For 
example, during the first fiscal quarter of 2013, which ended on 
April 30, 2012, Pandora’s total content acquisition costs were 
$55.8 million, corresponding to 69% of their reported revenues of 
$80.78 million.281 It is estimated that, of the $55.8 million in 
royalty fees, $52.2 million constitutes sound recording 
performance royalty payments to SoundExchange.282 Small 
                                                 
276
 Oxenford July 7, supra note 272. 
277
 Rising Tides, FUTURE OF MUSIC COAL., 
http://www.futureofmusic.org/issues/campaigns/rising-tides (last visited Apr. 
30, 2014). 
278
 Pureplay Agreement, supra note 272, at 34,797; Stockment, supra note 
26, at 2151.  
279
 Oxenford July 7, supra note 272. 
280
 Villasenor, supra note 182, at 11.  
281
 Press Release, Pandora Media, Inc., Pandora Reports 1Q13 Financial 
Results (May 23, 2012), available at http://investor.pandora.com/
phoenix.zhtml?c=227956&p=irol-newsArticle&ID=1699251&highlight=. 
282
 Villasenor, supra note 182, at 11–12. As a comparison, if Pandora were 
paying royalties according to the Webcaster II rates, their sound recording 
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pureplay webcasters, meanwhile, must pay the greater of either: (1) 
a percentage of gross revenues, ranging from 10% to 14%; or, (2) 
7% of expenses during the applicable year.283 The small pureplay 
option, however, is only available for the period from 2006 to 
2014.284 Finally, subscription services are required to pay on a per-
performance basis, at a rate ranging from .0008 cents in 2006 
to .0025 cents in 2015.285 Pureplay webcasters that did not opt into 
the Pureplay Agreements remain subject to the CRB’s royalty 
rates.286  
The Pureplay Agreement was widely hailed as having 
saved Internet radio.287 Although it allowed Pandora and other 
webcasters to continue streaming, it is far from a perfect solution, 
with at least one webcaster noting that it will prevent the Internet 
radio industry from prospering, “to a nearly fatal degree.”288 
                                                                                                             
performance licenses in 2012 would be tens of millions of dollars higher than 
under the Pureplay Agreement, thus approaching or exceeding their revenue for 
the year. Id. Whereas, under the Pureplay Agreement, the non-subscription 2012 
rate for large pureplay commercial webcasters is .0011 cents per performance, 
the corresponding 2012 rate under Webcaster II is .0021 cents. Id. 
283
 Pureplay Agreement, supra note 272, at 34,799–800. 
284
 Bagdanov, supra note 30, at 153; see Oxenford July 7, supra note 272. 
Small webcasters who elect to join the deal must do so on a yearly 
basis. Because the deal does not offer a small pureplay webcaster percentage of 
revenue option for 2015, the ability to opt out is important for the smaller 
webcaster who has not reached the $1.25 million cap by that time. In 2015, such 
a webcaster may choose to opt-in to what is known as the “Microcaster Deal” – 
a deal reached between SoundExchange and a number of very small webcasters 
whereby webcasters pay 12% on the first $250,000 of revenue.  
285
 Pureplay Agreement, supra note 272, at 34,799.  
286
 Pals, supra note 31, at 688. Note that, in 2011, the CRB set out its 
proposed webcast royalty rates for the period beginning in 2011 and ending in 
2015. See Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings and Ephemeral 
Recordings, 75 Fed. Reg. 16,377 (April 1, 2010).  
287
 Stockment, supra note 26, at 2153.  
288
 Rob Pegoraro, Web Radio Royalties Resolved*, THE WASHINGTON POST 
(July 8, 2009), http://voices.washingtonpost.com/fasterforward/2009/07/
web_radio_royalties_resolved_1.html. 
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Moreover, it is not a permanent solution to the problem. 
SoundExchange itself has stated that it views the Pureplay 
Agreement “as an experimental structure,” and that it “does not 
consider [the] terms indicative of fair market rates.”289 It goes 
without saying that the future of Internet radio is thus highly 
uncertain.  
V. A COMPARISON OF THE TWO STANDARDS 
As noted above, application of the two standards leads to 
drastically different royalty rate determinations. Whereas Internet 
radio companies—which are subject to the willing buyer/willing 
seller standard—are required to pay § 114 performance license 
royalties that approach or even exceed 100% of revenues,290 those 
grandfathered to the 801(b) Standard pay far less. These “pre-
existing” satellite radio and digital cable radio services—namely, 
Sirius XM, Music Choice and Muzak—pay a revenue-based sound 
recording performance royalty that amounts to only 6% to 8% of 
revenues.291  
These vastly different rates stem from the fact that the two 
standards have strikingly different underlying policy objectives. 
On the one hand, the 801(b) Standard: (i) seeks to balance the 
interests of the public, copyright owners and copyright users; (ii) 
takes into consideration the goal of copyright policy in fostering 
the availability of creative works to the public; (iii) takes into 
consideration the value provided by the copyright user in bringing 
the copyrighted works to the public; and, (iv) directs the CRB to 
avoid setting royalty rates that would have a disruptive impact on 
                                                 
289
 SoundExchange and “PurePlay” Webcasters Reach Unprecedented 




 Stockment, supra note 26, at 2160.  
291
 Id. at 2158; see Carey, supra note 90, at 302. 
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the industry using the copyrighted works.292 When the CRB sets a 
rate according to the 801(b) Standard, it will first establish a 
benchmark “marketplace” royalty rate, and then proceed to 
consider what influence—if any—each of the 801(b) factors 
should have in altering that starting point rate.293 For example, in 
the CRB’s December 2007 determination of the royalty rates to be 
paid by Sirius XM,294 the Board began by establishing a reasonable 
estimate of what would be paid in the marketplace, finding that 
13% of subscriber revenues should serve as the “upper boundary 
for a zone of reasonableness.”295 The Board then proceeded to chip 
away at that upper limit, ultimately concluding that the rates 
should start at 6% of gross revenue for 2006, and increase 
gradually to 8% in 2012.296 The 801(b) Standard’s fourth 
objective, in particular, played a key role in exerting downward 
pressure on the 13% upper limit.297 Specifically, by taking into 
consideration the harmful effects that a high royalty rate might 
have on the satellite radio industry, the CRB eventually decided on 
fees which pale in comparison to those paid by webcasters.  
In contrast, the two factors enumerated in the willing 
buyer/willing seller standard are “explicitly not to be used as a 
basis for adjusting rates.”298 CARP, in 2002, stated that the two 
factors—namely, (i) the service’s effect on phonorecord sales and 
other streams of revenue of the copyright owner; and, (ii) the 
relative roles of the copyright owner and the transmitting entity—
                                                 
292
 Stockment, supra note 26, at 2164.  
293
 Villasenor, supra note 182, at 8.  
294
 At the time of the proceedings, Sirius and XM were separate entities. 
They later merged in July 2008, and the new entity retained its status as a 
“preexisting service.” See id. at 7.  
295
 Determination of Rates and Terms for Preexisting Subscription Services 
and Satellite Digital Audio Radio Services, 73 Fed. Reg. 4080, 4094 (Jan. 24, 
2008). 
296
 Id. at 4098.  
297
 Villasenor, supra note 182, at 8.  
298
 Id. at 9.  
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are “merely factors to be considered, along with any other relevant 
factors, in determining rates under the willing buyer/willing seller 
standard.”299 In other words, the correct rates under the willing 
buyer/willing seller standard are simply those on which, “absent 
special circumstances, most willing buyers and willing sellers 
would agree.”300 The two factors are not justifications for deviating 
from a market-based rate.301 As such, the willing buyer/willing 
seller standard is extremely limited in scope. Not only does it 
completely disregard the public interest in the availability of 
creative works,302 it also fails to take into consideration the 
disruptive impact that high royalty rates will have on the industries 
involved. Unlike the 801(b) Standard, which directs the CRB to 
settle on a rate that affords both the copyright owner and the 
copyright user a fair revenue, the willing buyer/willing seller 
standard gives no regard to the income of the copyright user. At its 
core, the standard seems to focus on the recording industry’s “sales 
of phonorecords” and “streams of revenue,” thus “reflecting the 
recording industry’s argument that Internet radio is a threat.”303  
Although setting rates that would be acceptable to both 
willing buyers and willing sellers seems, on its face, to be a 
reasonable approach, it is clear that the standard has failed to 
produce appropriate results. After all, why, in a free market 
transaction, would any webcaster agree to rates that amount to as 
much as 100% or more of their revenues? One of the willing 
buyer/willing seller standard’s main deficiencies is that it fails to 
adequately account for individualized financial realities in the 
marketplace.304 For example, the CRB, in Webcaster II, set one 
rate for all webcasters, based on rates negotiated between major 
                                                 
299
 Webcaster 1 CARP Report, supra note 205, at 21. 
300
 Id. at 25. 
301
 Marshall, supra note 93, at 457.  
302
 Stockment, supra note 26, at 2166. 
303
 Id.  
304
 Roberston, supra note 250, at 548.  
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labels and large interactive webcasters. This approach ignores the 
unique circumstances that could justify a special status for small 
webcasters, who might be able to negotiate lower fees with record 
labels.305 Furthermore, the approach also ignores the fact that 
independent record labels would likely be willing to offer their 
music at a lower rate than major labels as an incentive for 
webcasters to broadcast their songs.306 By corralling all webcasters 
into a single, under-representative marketplace, rather than 
constructing a hypothetical marketplace for each actual market, the 
willing buyer/willing seller standard produced royalty rates that are 
far higher than what many webcasters would have negotiated in 
reality and which very few can afford.307  
VI. PROPOSED SOLUTIONS 
 The sound recording performance right structure in the 
United States is in clear need of reform. In this Part, I will put 
forward several proposals, which, if implemented, would help to 
rectify the current state of affairs.  
A. Achieving Platform Parity 
 Depending on the medium used to broadcast a sound 
recording, the compensation paid to the copyright owner varies 
considerably. On the one hand, terrestrial broadcasters—despite 
being required to pay songwriters for the use of their works—are 
completely exempt from paying royalties to performers and record 
                                                 
305
 Castro, supra note 27, at 6. The Small Webcaster Settlement Act, which 
created a special royalty option for small commercial entities, is evidence of the 
fact that small webcasters may require special treatment (see supra Part IV.F); 
moreover, Castro notes that discriminatory pricing, whereby a given product 
will be offered at different prices to different buyers, is common in many 
industries, including software development, the airline industry, and 
pharmaceutical companies. This practice can benefit both the producer and 
consumer.  
306
 Id.  
307
 Robertson, supra note 250, at 548.  
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labels. Satellite radio, digital cable radio, and Internet webcasting 
services, meanwhile, must pay sound recording copyright holders 
for the use of their copyrighted works—yet the royalty rates 
imposed by the CRB for these three types of digital radio range 
considerably, anywhere from 6% to more than 100% of a service’s 
annual revenue. This is despite the fact that all of these services 
perform essentially the same function.308 In other words, “whether 
and how much an [artist] is paid depends on how a user chooses to 
listen to music.”309 There is no logical reason for the vast 
differentiation in royalty rates.310  
The unequal treatment of the different technological 
platforms violates a core governing economic principle; that is, 
whenever possible, laws should be technologically neutral.311 The 
overarching goal of copyright law in the United States, as set out in 
the Constitution, is “to promote the progress of science and useful 
arts.”312 The law has a utilitarian purpose in that it is meant to 
incentivize authors to create works. This, in turn, enriches the 
public domain.313 Thus, copyright protection is granted with the 
purpose of promoting the progress of knowledge and learning for 
the good of society. The overall goals of copyright law cannot be 
achieved when copyright policy discriminates on the basis of 
technology, as is the case with sound recordings.314 When services 
that perform essentially the same function are subject to drastically 
different royalty rate determination standards, allowing some of 
                                                 
308
 Stockment, supra note 26, at 2161.  
309
 Spektor, supra note 79, at 15.  
310
 Pals, supra note 31, at 694.  
311
 Castro, supra note 27, at 1; see SYDNOR, supra note 34, at 11; see also 
Chris Reed, Taking Sides on Technology Neutrality, SCRIPTED, (2007) 4:3 263 
at 264, http://www2.law.ed.ac.uk/ahrc/script-ed/vol4-3/reed.asp (noting that, 
“technology neutrality has long been held up as a guiding principle for the 
proper regulation of technology”). 
312
 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
313
 Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975).  
314
 Stockment, supra note 26, at 2167.  
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those services to flourish while others fold, the public will not 
benefit to the full extent possible from a dissemination of 
knowledge and learning.  
Platform parity is the notion that “all music services subject 
to the sound recording performance royalty should pay a royalty 
determined by the same standard.”315 This does not necessarily 
mean that all technologies should pay the same royalty rate. It may 
very well be necessary that different royalty rates be applied to the 
different technological platforms, based on their promotional 
value, level of interactivity, and ability to displace sales.316 
However, it is crucial that the different technologies be subject to 
the same rate-setting standard. Thus, Congress should amend the 
current laws so as to direct the CRB to apply the same standard to 
all services for which it currently determines royalty rates. Which 
of the two standards ought to be applied, however, is the subject of 
fierce debate.  
On one side of the argument, a group of webcasters, led by 
Pandora,317 has come together to urge Congress to adopt the 
Internet Radio Fairness Act (IRFA),318 which proposes to replace 
the market-oriented willing buyer/willing seller standard with the 
four-part 801(b) Standard for setting webcasting royalty rates. 
Meanwhile, the RIAA has come out in support of a competing bill 
                                                 
315
 David Oxenford, Senate Judiciary Committee Hearing on Radio 
Performance Royalty and Platform Parity for Webcaster Royalties, BROADCAST 




 Stockment, supra note 26, at 2167.  
317
 Glenn Peoples, Internet Radio Fairness Act Slips Into Hibernation, 
BILLBOARD (Jan. 3, 2013, 3:11 AM), http://www.billboard.com/biz/articles/
news/1510514/internet-radio-fairness-act-slips-into-hibernation.  
318
 Internet Radio Fairness Act, H.R. 6480, S. 3609, 112th Cong. (2012).  
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in draft form, called the Interim FIRST Act,319 which would direct 
the CRB to apply the willing buyer/willing seller standard when 
setting rates for all services, including those currently 
grandfathered to the 801(b) Standard. Unfortunately, the 112th 
Congress wrapped up prior to IRFA being passed, and before the 
Interim FIRST Act could be introduced. However, it is expected 
that both bills will be put forward during the 113th Congress, thus 
setting the stage for a political fight that is expected to carry on for 
years.320  
As discussed above in Part V, the willing buyer/willing 
seller standard suffers from various flaws; namely, it disregards the 
public interest in the availability of creative works, and fails to 
consider the impact that high royalty rates will have on the services 
involved. Application of this standard has led to “onerous rates 
that, absent congressional intervention, have risked driving 
innovative companies out of business.”321 Despite its noble 
intentions, the standard fails to produce rates that would willingly 
be agreed to by market participants. On the other hand, the broad 
nature of the 801(b) Standard allows the CRB to factor in an array 
of policy considerations when setting rates. As such, the 801(b) 
Standard better captures the constitutional purpose of copyright 
law.322 It properly balances the interests of copyright holders, 
                                                 
319
 Interim Fairness in Radio Starts Today (FIRST) Act of 2012, Discussion 
Draft (Aug. 7, 2012 3:36 PM), http://nadler.house.gov/sites/nadler.house.gov/
files/documents/NADLER_153_xml.pdf. Note that the bill also proposes to end 
the royalty exemption currently enjoyed by terrestrial broadcasters, subjecting 
them instead to the willing buyer/willing seller standard.  
320
 Glenn Peoples, Business Matters: Let's Get Ready To Rumble! 2013's 




 Villasenor, supra note 182, at 13.  
322
 Stockment, supra note 26, at 2168.  
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broadcasters, and the public, thus leading to more equitable royalty 
rate determinations for all parties involved.323 
Although IRFA has been highly criticized by its 
opponents,324 it is clearly a better alternative than the Interim 
FIRST Act. Extending the 801(b) Standard to webcasters is the 
best approach for achieving platform parity among digital audio 
broadcasters. However, when applying the 801(b) Standard, the 
CRB must ensure that all services pay a fair rate to sound 
recording copyright owners. The CRB, in other words, must strive 
to set rates that will allow webcasters to maintain a viable business, 
yet not at the expense of copyright owners.325 It is expected that 
tensions between sound recording copyright owners and 
webcasters will continue to intensify as the 2015 expiration date of 
the Pureplay Agreement approaches.326 Thus, it is crucial that 
IRFA be reintroduced and passed in the 113th Congress in order to 
bring some closure to this contentious issue. 
B. Ending the Terrestrial Radio Exemption: The Performance 
Rights Act 
 Although applying the 801(b) Standard to all digital radio 
providers will level the playing field among those services, more 
needs to be done in order to achieve full platform parity. Namely, 
the sound recording public performance royalty exemption 
currently enjoyed by terrestrial radio must be brought to an end. 
                                                 
323
 Pals, supra note 31, at 694.  
324
 See, e.g., Testimony of Jeffrey A. Eisenach, PH.D. Before the 
Subcommittee on Intellectual Property, Competition and the Internet Committee 
(Nov. 28, 2012), http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/Hearings%202012/
Eisenach%2011282012.pdf; see also Marshall, supra note 93, at 463.  
325
 Whereas webcasters currently pay royalty rates that are prohibitively 
high, the services grandfathered to the 801(b) Standard arguably pay 
unjustifiably low fees. The CRB must strive to find a better balance between 
compensating copyright owners, and not disrupting the copyright user’s business 
model.  
326
 Marshall, supra note 93, at 463.  
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Despite AM/FM broadcasters earning upwards of $20 billion per 
year in advertising revenue, they do not pay a cent to the artists and 
musicians who bring life to the songs that they broadcast.327 This 
issue, for more than three-quarters of a century, has been the 
subject of heated debate, with Congress rejecting at least thirty 
bills that sought to create a general performance right in sound 
recordings.328  
 On February 4, 2009, the Performance Rights Act (PRA)329 
was introduced in slightly different versions in the House of 
Representatives and in the Senate, becoming the latest attempt to 
rectify the current inequity in royalty payment obligations. 
Unfortunately, neither version of the bill advanced to a floor vote 
during the 111th Congress. Despite having the full support of the 
Obama Administration,330 the PRA was not reintroduced in the 
112th Congress. At present, its future remains uncertain.  
 The PRA aims to expand the scope of § 106(6) exclusive 
public performance rights by including all performances made 
publicly “by means of an audio transmission,” thereby 
encompassing terrestrial broadcasts.331 In essence, the PRA seeks 
to end the royalty exemption that AM/FM radio has long enjoyed. 
Under the PRA, terrestrial radio stations, like non-interactive 
                                                 
327
 See Noh, supra note 17, at 95 (“In 2006, radio earned an estimated $20 
billion in ad revenue. From those earnings, songwriters were paid roughly $600 
million. Recording artists were paid nothing.”).  
328
 Sen, supra note 64, at 234–35.  
329
 Performance Rights Act, H.R. 848, S. 379, 111th Cong. (2009). Note 
that the bill was first introduced in 2007, but “failed to garner sufficient votes to 
pass in the House in 2008.” Day, Super Brawl, supra note 40, at 192.  
330
 La France, supra note 76, at 233.  
331
 H.R. 848 § 2(a); S. 379 § 2(a). The PRA would strike the word “digital” 
from 17 U.S.C. § 106(6). Note that while the amended statute would give rights 
to performances by means of an audio transmission, the right will not extend to 
other public performances of sound recordings, such as those in music venues, 
restaurants, or other business establishments. See La France, supra note 76, at 
233. 
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webcasters, would become subject to statutorily prescribed rates as 
set out in § 114 of the Copyright Act and as determined by the 
CRB.332 Smaller commercial broadcast stations, however, would 
be subject to a flat rate royalty fee ranging from $100 to $5000 
annually.333 It is estimated that “nearly 80% of radio stations 
operating in the United States today would qualify for a flat, 
annual rate.”334 Non-profit broadcasters and college radio stations, 
meanwhile, would also be subject to discounted annual fees,335 
while religious stations and stations that use sound recordings only 
incidentally would be completely exempt under the Act.336  
 For all parties involved, the PRA offers an equitable solution 
to the current royalty dispute. As such, it is essential that the PRA 
be reintroduced in the 113th Congress and the royalty exemption 
for terrestrial broadcasters brought to an end. As discussed below, 
there are several compelling reasons why terrestrial broadcasters 
should begin paying sound recording copyright holders for the use 
of their performances.  
1. The Promotional-Value Argument is Flawed and Outdated  
 Time and time again, Congress’s justification for declining to 
extend public performance rights to sound recording copyright 
                                                 
332
 H.R. 848 § 2(c); S. 379 § 2(b). Note that 17 U.S.C. § 114(f)(2)(B) 
(2012) currently directs the CRB to use the willing buyer/willing seller standard 
when determining rates. However, if IRFA is passed in the 113th Congress, § 
114 would be amended to replace the willing buyer/willing seller standard with 
the 801(b) Standard.  
333
 H.R. 848 § 3(a)(1); S. 379 § 3(a)(1). Under the House bill, smaller 
commercial broadcast stations (those whose annual gross revenues do not 
exceed $1.25 million) would pay an annual fee ranging from $500 to $5000, 
depending on their annual revenue. Under the Senate Judiciary Committee’s 
version of the bill, on the other hand, smaller commercial broadcast stations 
would pay an annual fee ranging from $100 to $5000.  
334
 Day, Super Brawl, supra note 40, at 193.  
335
 H.R. 848 § 3(a)(1); S. 379 § 3(a)(1). 
336
 H.R. 848 § 3(b); S. 379 § 3(b). 
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owners has been the need to maintain “an alleged economic 
balance between” the radio industry and recording artists.337 
Namely, the belief that radio play spurs record sales has justified 
the long-standing imbalance in copyright law as it pertains to 
music.338 This “promotional-value” argument claims that recording 
artists do not need a general performance right for terrestrial radio 
because the promotional value of radio airplay adequately 
compensates them for the use of their copyrighted works.339 This 
argument is both “invalid and outdated.”340  
 Whether or not radio airplay indeed provides a promotional 
value for recording artists has long been hotly debated.341 Although 
it is likely true that terrestrial radio provides some degree of 
promotional value to sound recording copyright owners, it is 
unquestionable that the extent of that value has been in decline. 
With the advent of the Internet and other alternative platforms for 
listening to music, terrestrial radio is no longer the force that it 
                                                 
337
 Noh, supra note 17, at 97.  
338
 See supra Part II.E. 
339




 The NAB, for instance, argues that the symbiotic relationship between 
radio and the music industry results in roughly $1.5 to $2.4 billion in free 
promotion annually for record labels. See Day, Super Brawl, supra note 40, at 
195. Others point to “Payola,” the illegal practice of radio stations accepting 
money from the music industry to increase airplay of certain records, as 
evidence of the promotional benefit of airplay. This practice, which continues to 
this day, suggests that radio airplay creates significant value for the copyright 
owner, especially in terms of promoting new music. See Castro, supra note 27, 
at 8. On the other hand, a study in 2007 by an economics professor at the 
University of Texas at Dallas found that radio use is negatively correlated to the 
sale of sound recordings. Noh, supra note 17, at 100. “[T]he study found that 
approximately one additional hour of radio listening per person per day 
corresponded with a 0.75 drop in the number of albums purchased per capita in 
a given city over the course of a year.” Id. Others note that the promotional-
value argument overlooks the fact that older songs are still “regularly performed 
on terrestrial radio but derive little to no promotional value from such radio 
airplay.” Day, Super Brawl, supra note 40, at 196.  
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once was. Over the past few decades, the market share historically 
held by terrestrial radio has been increasingly usurped by these 
alternative platforms for music listening.342 The growing 
popularity of iPods, the Internet, and subscription satellite and 
digital cable radio services has caused terrestrial radio to lose 
listeners, and, along with them, advertising revenue.343  
 Whereas in the past terrestrial radio was one of the only 
effective methods of introducing audiences to new music,344 today, 
85% of teenagers discover new music through alternative sources, 
such as the Internet.345 The Internet provides consumers with the 
means to discover new music and repeatedly listen to one’s 
favorite music to an extent not possible on terrestrial radio. A 
listener could spend weeks on YouTube, for example—listening to 
songs of their choice for free—and not even scratch the surface of 
available musical content. The Internet’s user-friendly 
functionality and limitless potential puts it light-years ahead of 
terrestrial radio, which is a rather stale and outdated model of 
exposing consumers to music. The promotional-value argument, in 
other words, “is increasingly anachronistic. . . . [I]t presumes that 
the 21st Century will be like the 1960s: A world in which radio is 
the way to promote new music, and songs that become hits 
promote sales of entire albums.”346 Neither of these presumptions 
remains true in this modern age. Although traditional radio 
                                                 
342
 Donahue, supra note 111, at 1301. 
343
 UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, 
TELECOMMUNICATIONS: THE PROPOSED PERFORMANCE RIGHTS ACT WOULD 
RESULT IN ADDITIONAL COSTS FOR BROADCAST RADIO STATIONS AND 
ADDITIONAL REVENUE FOR RECORD COMPANIES, MUSICIANS, AND PERFORMERS 
11 (2010), available at http://www.gao.gov/assets/310/308569.pdf. 
344
 Donahue, supra note 111, at 1300 (noting that “in the early days of 
radio, there was no better way to disseminate information quickly to a large 
body of the public”). 
345
 Noh, supra note 17, at 96. 
346
 SYDNOR, supra note 34, at 9.  
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continues to be an influential media source for consumers,347 it is 
now one of many platforms used to introduce audiences to new 
artists. Moreover, it is likely that terrestrial radio’s market share 
and promotional ability will continue to decline in the future.  
 Not only is terrestrial radio becoming increasingly 
unnecessary as a marketing tool used by the recording industry to 
expose audiences to new music, its ability to spur record sales is 
also questionable. In 2012, “sales of albums and track equivalents 
[were] down slightly at -1.8%” from the previous year,348 while 
total revenue stood at $16.5 billion—less than half of the 
industry’s pre-digital size.349 Regardless of whether people are 
tuning in to terrestrial radio, consumers are simply not purchasing 
music to the same extent as in the past. This is due, in large part, to 
rampant illegal file sharing, which has helped to create an attitude 
that music ought to be free.350 For instance, one study found that 
the vast majority of teens believe that file sharing is so easy to do, 
that it is “unrealistic to expect people not to do it.”351 Music sales 
                                                 
347
 Bagdanov, supra note 30, at 156.  
348
 The Nielsen Company & Billboard’s 2012 Music Industry Report, 
BUSINESS WIRE (Jan. 4, 2013, 7:13 AM), http://www.businesswire.com/news/
home/20130104005149/en/Nielsen-Company-Billboard’s-2012-Music-Industry-
Report [hereinafter Nielsen].  
349
 Eric Pfanner, Music Industry Sales Rise, and Digital Revenue Gets the 




 Kella, supra note 96, at 220. The RIAA notes that since the peer-to-peer 
file-sharing site Napster emerged in 1999, music sales in the U.S. have dropped 




exact= (last visited June 26, 2013). 
351
 Amanda Lenhart & Mary Madden, Teen Content Creators and 
Consumers, PEW RESEARCH INTERNET PROJECT (Nov. 2, 2005), http://
www.pewinternet.org/2005/11/02/part-2-teens-as-content-consumers.  
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have suffered as a result of such attitudes. Consumers increasingly 
expect that music be available for free, and accessible from 
anywhere—a service that webcasters such as Pandora can provide. 
Due to the current unhealthy state of the music industry, the 
reasons that may have once justified the exemption for terrestrial 
broadcasters no longer make “legal, equitable, or economic 
sense.”352   
2. Creating a Level Playing Field for all Services  
 As noted above, the goals of copyright law cannot be 
achieved when services that perform essentially the same function 
are treated unequally. It is crucial that the terrestrial radio royalty 
exemption be brought to an end in order to establish a better 
balance between digital audio transmission services and terrestrial 
broadcasters. So long as terrestrial broadcasters remain exempt 
from paying sound recording performance royalties, they will have 
an unfair advantage over webcasters, and, to a lesser extent, 
satellite radio and digital cable radio services. Webcasters are 
simply unable to compete with terrestrial radio. As such, the 
exemption currently enjoyed by terrestrial radio—to the detriment 
of Internet radio—no longer makes sense.  
 The unequal treatment of the various mediums is especially 
unjust considering that Internet radio provides a greater 
promotional value for artists than terrestrial radio.353 Despite the 
music industry’s suffering revenues as of late, digital sales are in 
fact thriving. For instance, in 2012, digital albums and tracks saw 
year-over-year sales increases of 14.1% and 5.1%, respectively.354 
The relatively healthy state of the digital music market is due in 
part to the fact that webcasters facilitate the purchase of music. For 
                                                 
352
 Noh, supra note 17, at 86. 
353
 Bagdanov, supra note 30, at 157.  
354
 Nielsen, supra note 348. Note that the increase in digital sales has not 
been able to make up for the massive drop in physical sales, which declined by 
13% over the same period. Id.   
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instance, “on most webcasting stations, the artist’s name, song 
name, and album name are displayed next to a purchase option, a 
feature not available on terrestrial radio stations.”355 Moreover, 
Internet radio broadens the public’s access to music to an extent 
not possible on terrestrial radio by providing a platform for 
independent artists and non-mainstream genres of music.356 That is 
to say, Internet radio services advance the interests of artists in 
ways that terrestrial broadcasters cannot,357 yet pay exorbitant 
royalty fees. Terrestrial radio, meanwhile, continues to enjoy an 
exemption from paying public performance royalties to artists, 
despite its waning ability to hold up its end of the bargain in its 
supposed symbiotic relationship with the music industry. Under 
this scheme, the competitive landscape “is biased in favor of the 
old establishment players and against new start-up and innovative 
technologies.”358  
3. Performers Deserve Compensation for Their Work 
 Without question, the performance of a song can add great 
value to a musical composition. As demonstrated by Aretha 
Franklin’s powerful rendition of “Respect,” a talented performer 
can bring new life to a musical work by adding unique elements 
that appeal to listeners. This explains why certain versions of a 
                                                 
355
 Bagdanov, supra note 30, at 158.  
356
 Spektor, supra note 79, at 85. Note that terrestrial radio predominantly 
plays mainstream artists. See id.; Duvall, supra note 101, at 294. 
357
 Pals, supra note 31, at 692 (noting that: (i) webcasts do not suffer from 
the geographical limitations characteristic of terrestrial stations’ analog signals; 
(ii) unlike AM/FM radio, there is no limit to the number of webcasts that can be 
transmitted over the Internet, thus increasing its ability to promote more music 
and a greater variety of genres; (iii) webcast technology helps listeners find 
music that they will potentially like based on their previous listening habits; and, 
(iv) webcast listeners are more likely to buy music). 
358
 Performance Rights Act: Hearing on H.R. 848 Before the H. Comm. on 
the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 192 (2009) (testimony of Mitch Bainwol, Chairman 
and CEO, RIAA), available at http://judiciary.house.gov/_files/hearings/
printers/111th/111-8_47922.PDF [hereinafter Hearing on H.R. 848].  
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composition are more popular than others, and why non-
performing songwriters dream of having their songs sung by the 
top performers in the industry. Performers also serve as 
indispensable intermediaries, enabling listeners to enjoy musical 
works. Without such intermediaries, audiences would be left with 
nothing more than written musical score—something that very few 
of us can fully appreciate or enjoy. Non-performing songwriters, 
for instance, require performers to bring life to their compositions. 
Performers thus play an essential role in connecting audiences with 
musical compositions.    
 Because the performance of a song adds value to a musical 
composition, it also provides value to terrestrial radio broadcasters, 
who will broadcast what the audience wants to hear. For this 
reason, it is only fair that broadcasters compensate sound recording 
copyright owners for the use of their creative works. As the 
promotional-value argument becomes increasingly anachronistic 
and invalid, there is no reason why performers and songwriters 
should be treated differently when their songs are played on 
terrestrial radio. Both songwriters and performers should be paid 
because both are important in the creative process.  
 Not only is terrestrial radio’s exemption from paying 
performance rights for sound recordings harmful to recording 
artists, it is also inconsistent with the legislative intent of the 
Copyright Act.359 Although allowing terrestrial radio stations to 
broadcast music to vast audiences without compensating the 
performer may increase the public’s access to recorded musical 
works in the short-term, it fails to incentivize the artist, thus 
reducing the likelihood that new recordings will be produced in the 
future. This practice is thus contrary to the utilitarian purpose of 
copyright law.360 As music sales continue to struggle, resulting in 
declining income for performers, there is no reason why 
                                                 
359
 Noh, supra note 17, at 94.  
360
 See supra Part VI.A. 
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songwriters should be incentivized to compose songs, while 
performers are not equally incentivized to create sound recordings. 
Due to the current state of the music industry, “recording artists 
need and deserve the . . . full complement of copyrights granted to 
all other creators.”361 Terrestrial broadcasters, like any other 
business, should pay for the inputs that allow their industry to 
succeed. Any industry that profits off the labor of others should be 
required to pay those who provide the labor.362  
 The PRA would help to correct the current royalty imbalance 
by making “property ownership benefits for sound recordings 
equal to that of musical works and every other copyrightable 
expression.”363 Importantly, the proposed Act includes a provision 
that preserves performance rights for musical works. This would 
ensure that the gains for recording artists would not come at the 
expense of compositional copyright holders.364 
4. U.S. Performers are Losing Out on Foreign Royalties 
 The lack of a general performance right in the United States 
is not simply an issue of artists losing out on compensation 
domestically. The ramifications of the exemption stretch far 
beyond America’s borders. When it comes to the production and 
exportation of sound recordings, the United States has long been a 
dominant force, standing head and shoulders above all other 
nations.365 “American music gets more radio airplay around the 
                                                 
361
 SYDNOR, supra note 34, at 10. 
362
 Noh, supra note 17, at 98.  
363
 Id. at 88.  
364
 Performance Rights Act, H.R. 848 § 5; S. 379 § 5, 111th Cong. (2009).  
365
 Fernando Ferreira & Joel Waldfogel, Pop Internationalism: Has a Half 
Century of World Music Trade Displaced Local Culture? 123 ECON. J. 634, 641 
(2013) (“Music from the US takes up the largest share of the world market but 
its share fell from nearly 80 percent in 1960 to a low of 40 percent in the mid-
1980s. Since then, the US share has risen fairly steadily to its current level of 
nearly 60 percent.”). 
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world than the music of any other country.”366 Yet, despite this 
impressive cultural output, the United States is one of the only 
industrialized nations that does not provide sound recordings with 
a general performance right.367 Because the United States does not 
pay a performance royalty to foreign performers when their songs 
are played on U.S. terrestrial radio, many foreign countries 
withhold performance royalties owed to American artists when 
their songs are played abroad—even though such countries 
compensate their own artists and the artists of countries other than 
the United States.368 As such, the lack of a general performance 
right results in a significant net loss to the U.S. economy,369 
                                                 
366
 Hearing on H.R. 848, supra note 358, at 194 (prepared statement of 
Mitch Bainwol, Chairman and CEO, RIAA).  
367
 Day, Super Brawl, supra note 40, at 197–98; see SYDNOR, supra note 
34, at 13 (“The U.S. is now the only OEDC [Organisation For Economic Co-
operation and Development] nation that fails to provide the general public-
performance rights for sound recordings required by both the 1963 Rome 
Convention and the 1996 WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty 
[WPPT].”) The U.S. is not a party to the Rome Convention; it did accede to the 
WPPT, however, “the U.S. has opted out of the public performance right under 
[WPPT] Art. 15(3), except with respect to certain digital transmissions.” La 
France, supra note 76, at 226 
368
Hearing on H.R. 848, supra note 358, at 194; see La France, supra note 
76, at 224 (noting that foreign rights societies withhold royalties owed to U.S. 
performers due to the absence of material reciprocity). For example, royalties 
withheld from U.S. artists in France are given to the French Ministry of Culture, 
and are ultimately used to subsidize competing French artists, thus enriching 
France at the expense of U.S. sound recording copyright owners. SYDNOR, supra 
note 34, at 13–14. “The performance royalty collection practices of other 
countries vary widely,” with some countries opting “not [to] collect royalties 
arising from the broadcast of U.S. sound recordings,” some opting to “collect 
and impound them, and others opting to collect them and divert them toward 
other purposes.” Id. at 14 n.39. 
369
 If there was no exemption for U.S. terrestrial broadcasters, the amount 
in royalties paid by foreign broadcasters to U.S. artists and labels would far 
outweigh the amount paid by U.S. terrestrial broadcasters to foreign artists and 
labels, considering that U.S. artists receive the bulk of airplay around the world.  
77
Blouw: Just Asking for a Little "Respect": Radio, Webcasting & the Sound
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2014
[5:353 2014] CYBARIS®, AN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW REVIEW 430 
potentially to the tune of hundreds of millions of dollars.370 Both 
U.S. performers and record labels miss out on this much-needed 
income while their counterparts—songwriters and publishers—
receive royalties from broadcasters from around the globe for the 
use of their compositions.  
VII. CONCLUSION 
 The time to end the discriminatory treatment inherent in 
U.S. copyright law is long overdue. It is essential that Congress act 
swiftly to correct the current imbalances in the law by: (i) ending 
the royalty exemption currently enjoyed by terrestrial radio; and 
(ii) subjecting all services to the same royalty rate determination 
standard. In this paper, I have demonstrated how the current 
system is strikingly unfair. First, the law creates an incentive 
structure for songwriters that is absent for performers, thus failing 
to recognize the great value that performers add to a composition. 
Second, by subjecting webcasters to the willing buyer/willing 
seller standard, rather than to the more sensible 801(b) Standard, 
the law prevents webcasters from successfully competing with 
other radio technologies. Terrestrial broadcasters, in particular, are 
afforded an incredible advantage over their competition; they are 
permitted to broadcast sound recordings without having to 
compensate the performers who bring those songs to life. Old 
technology, in other words, receives favorable treatment under the 
law. This is done on the basis of the outdated and flawed 
promotional-value argument, at the expense of newer, more 
innovative technology. The law, in its current form, is not 
technologically neutral, and must be amended.  
                                                 
370
 La France, supra note 76, at 226. Estimates of how much U.S. artists 
forego in foreign royalties vary widely. One expert estimates that U.S. recording 
artists have lost roughly $600 million in foreign performance royalties over the 
last several years. Id. Others estimate that foreign collecting societies withhold 
$70-100 million in royalties per year from U.S. performers and labels. Id. 
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 Not only do these unfair copyright policies disadvantage 
performers and webcasters, they also inhibit the creation of new 
music. Because performers do not receive compensation equal to 
that of their songwriting counterparts, this policy, at its extreme, 
has the potential to dissuade the next Aretha Franklin from 
choosing a career as a recording artist.371 As a result, 
groundbreaking performances of pre-existing compositions may be 
less likely to occur, thus potentially depriving the public of 
culturally valuable forms of artistic expression. In this modern era 
of declining music sales, it is crucial that performers be granted a 
full public performance right in order to ensure that they are as 
incentivized as their songwriting counterparts to create music.  
 By imposing prohibitively high royalty burdens on 
webcasters, the law threatens to deprive the public of an excellent 
platform for accessing music. Despite the fact that all radio 
services perform essentially the same basic function, webcasting 
offers a number of unique advantages over its competitors. 
Namely, because there is no limit to the number of webcasters that 
can occupy the airwaves, webcasting technology delivers a wealth 
of musical variety to listeners. 372 This, in turn, provides lesser-
known, independent artists with exposure to the public—an 
opportunity that is not often available to them on terrestrial 
                                                 
371
 In addition, the policy might incentivize performers to compose their 
own songs, thus potentially resulting in lower-quality compositions. Arguably, 
the best music will result when a talented songwriter pairs with a talented 
performer. In many cases, a songwriter can perform these two roles to great 
results. However, not all talented performers are capable of writing their own 
songs. Such performers should nonetheless be fully incentivized to record the 
compositions of others. See Sen, supra note 64, at 236 (arguing that the 
Copyright Act’s current imbalanced incentive structure has had a positive effect 
in that it has led to the rise of the performer-songwriter movement, which has in 
turn substantially contributed “to the exchange of [the] political ideals that 
underlie our democratic institutions, while imposing only small costs on 
performers”). 
372
 See Pals, supra note 31, at 692.  
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radio.373 As a result, webcasting enriches the public domain by 
promoting the dissemination of unique forms of musical 
expression to vast audiences. By subjecting Internet radio to the 
flawed willing buyer/willing seller standard, the law threatens to 
deprive the public of a valuable resource by preventing webcasters 
from effectively competing with other radio services. Without this 
important forum for publicly performing their works, non-
mainstream artists might, in turn, be dissuaded from creating new 
music. The current policies are thus contrary to copyright law’s 
overarching purpose of promoting the progress of science and the 
useful arts, as set out in the U.S. Constitution. Performers and 
webcasters are just asking for a little respect. It is high time that we 
give it to them. 
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